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An economic and policy analysis unit is being added to Sequence 2. 
FOREWORD 
This second edition of Sequence 2 Curriculum Statement is 
faithful to the purpose of the first statement in 1975 to present in 
one place an overview of national policies and programs which deal 
with overriding national problems. In this area, it is difficult to keep 
current with the rush of events because of changing contextual 
conditions, the extension of goals, and the revision of programs to 
benefit from experience in program administration. The authors of 
the curriculum statement for Sequence 2 have made a notable 
effort to do so, we believe, with considerable success. The reader 
must realize, however, that although the curriculum statement 
provides a guide in broad outline identifying basic problems, signif-
icant issues, and trends in program development, it is up to the 
reader to fill in many details as changes occur. 
Dr. DeWitt C. Armstrong III, Brig. Gen., U.S. Army (Ret.), 
who is a veteran of strategic planning assignments with the De-
partments of the Army, Defense, and State, as well as numerous 
military commands in Europe, Asia, and the United States, has 
added new material to Unit 1. Dr. Herbert C. Morton, co-author of 
the most widely read of all Brookings books, An Introduction to 
Economic Reasoning, former Associate Commissioner in the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, and currently Director of Public Affairs 
at Resources for the Future, has replaced William S. Warne as the 
author of Unit 2, and has given increased attention to the mysteries 
and intractabilities of controlling the economy. Richard L. Seggel, 
currently Program Operations Officer in the National Institute of 
Medicine, National Academy of Science, a life-long student of 
national social policy, saw much of it from the inside, as an admin-
istrator for a third of a century in Federal social policy agencies, 
including the U.S. Public Health Service, the National Institutes of 
Health (as Associate Director for Administration), and HEW 
(Deputy Assistant Secretary for Health Policy Implementation). 
His extensive revision of Unit 3 provides a comprehensive review 
of the evolution of national social policies over half a century of 
dramatic advances as well as some discouraging disappointments. 
The curriculum statement for Sequence 2 reflects the rich-
ness, variety, and complexity of national efforts to deal with im-
perative problems. It is a story of mingled triumphs, limited suc-
cesses, and some misfires. The curriculum statement requires 
careful reading and thoughtful reflection. Participants who give it 
this attention will find that they have a solid base on which to build 
in their additional required reading, and in increasing their com-
prehensions of this dynamic and demanding area of public adminis-
tration. 
The task of the three authors in updating the curriculum 
statement was not easy, and we are greatly indebted to them for 
their careful review and analysis of events from an experience-
based perspective. 
-John M. Clarke, Director 
Center for the Study of Administration 
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THE NATURE AND PURPOSE 
OF THE SEQUENCE 
Policies. which are guidelines by which governments move to 
achieve, or to aid in the achievement of society·s goals, are obvi-
ously of great concern to administrators; for administrators are 
necessarily major contributors to the formulation of policy, and 
they bear the burden of the action to carry out policies. Without 
their contribution to the formulation process, policies are likely to 
be ill conceived for execution; and unless there is feedback of 
experience in execution into the process of policy refinement, the 
emerging needs of society may be too long ignored, leading to 
stagnation rather than progress in attaining goals. 
The Focus of The Policy Formulator Sequence 
The functions of government are now so extensive and the 
programs by which the functions are sought to be achieved are so 
varied and numerous, that it baffles the mind to comprehend them 
all. Each has its purpose. its proponents. and its clienteles. as well 
as its authority, organization, procedures, personnel and funds. It 
is obviously not possible in any course in public administration to 
L 
survey them all, let alone to study them intensively. The purpo~~ 0! 
this sequence is rather to consider three program areas on "!' 1~ 
especial public and governmental attention is centered m t e 
l. u"mpera-1980's. In these areas there are high priority goals, po icy 1 • 
tives," so to speak. In these areas the public administrator's role m 
contributing to policy formulation and development must ~e 
played fully and efficiently, if there is to be adequate progre~s 10 
developing feasible action programs which can deal effecuvely 
with urgent problems. 
The Stages of Action 
Stages in governmental action may be noted, among them: the 
identification of difficulties and danger, or problems and needs 
which are of social consequence; the arousing of public concern; 
the fixing and/or clarification of goals; the development of ideas for 
remedial action; sorting out alternatives; determining intermediate 
objectives and selecting means to reach the ultimate goals; devis-
ing action programs-methods, organization, manpower; assign-
ing powers and allocating resources; and the drive to execute plans 
and programs feeding back into revisions the lessons of operating 
experience. There is no stage at which the administrator cannot 
make a useful .. input," directly or indirectly, although it must more 
often than not be advisory, informative, and persuasive rather than 
authoritative, especially in the early stages of policy formulation. 
But since so much depends upon the administrator's "input," he 
must find ways of making it effectively without interfering with the 
contribution of other and perhaps more obvious contributors to 
public policy. 
Goals are Important 
Not much happens in public affairs until society's goals are 
established and until there is public commitment to them, but the 
experienced administrator knows that the means, methods, and 
style ofaction are just as important as the goals and objectives, and 
that goals cannot be obtained until efficient means of action are 
found, or invented. Despite centuries of concern with public 
health, Western civilization made little or no progress in controlling 
disease until the 19th Century bacteriologists broke through the 
ignorance barrier to determine the nature and cause of disease. 
Since then progress has been phenomenal, but the possibility of 
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effective action is still limited by the extent of knowledge of 
causes, and by the availability of effective means. In this, as in 
other fields of social need and concern, governments have to know 
what they are doing to be effective. 
Some goals of public policy are long established and relatively 
stable, although they may be latent rather than salient in the public 
consciousness-until they are challenged. For example-domes-
tic order, and national security. Others are newer and changing, and 
partly because they are newer, they seem to be quite ambitious. 
But here, too, new goals have antecedents going back a long way, 
even though the precursors were, by today's standards, very mod-
est. Western civilization, for example, has been concerned with 
relieving destitution in some way since nation states emerged from 
feudal Europe; but the welfare, public assistance and social insur-
ance programs of today have advanced a long way from the 
Elizabethan poor law reforms. The goals are still advancing, and 
the methods of attaining them are also changing. 
Policy Imperatives 
Some public goals take precedence over others, although 
priorities may change with time and circumstances. Goals also 
vary in the firmness of public commitment. A few goals have an 
overriding importance, and there is a firm commitment to a more or 
less determinable objective. These goals are ••imperatives"; there 
is almost a compulsion to attain them. These imperatives outrank 
all others, and tend to have preferred access to funds and re-
sources. Real difficulties arise when the policy imperatives con-
flict. These conflicts tax the wits, ingenuity and honesty of public 
figures (and other administrators as well). It is this competition for 
resources and conflict of goals which make public administration 
particularly difficult in the 1980's. 
Some of the country's long established and formerly latent 
goals have been challenged. Newer goals keep advancing, making 
more and more demands on national resources. Suddenly still 
newer imperatives not only compete for resources but challenge 
prior imperatives. The conflict of goals then becomes very real. 
The public, and also the experts, tend to be confused. The adminis-
trator is hard put to bring his knowledge and experience to bear 
upon the issues. He finds it difficult to get the real problems 
understood and to get evidentiary data considered. Last but not 
lll 
least , it is hard for the administrator to escape being made the 
scapegoat if problems fall short of objectives, and if necessary 
accommodations to conflicting purposes are unacce ptable to one 
important segment of society or another. 
It is no comfort to the professional administrator to know that 
when political executives in positions of top power and re sponsibil-
ity blame the failures, or limited successes, of government o n their 
predecessors, and when they a ttack the " bureaucracy," it may be 
done in order to distract attention from their own meage r perfor-
mance as executive leaders. The professional administrator has no 
such recourse. He is committed to making public programs work to 
the maximum extent possible, whether or not the goals were set 
within reason , and in spite of the fact that mandated programs may 
have been misconceived. He must try to make his advice available 
in time , and with sufficient persuasiveness, to avoid these handi-
caps; but he is not a lways successful. 
/ 11f111e11ce and R esponsibility 
Fortunately the professional administrator 's contrib t· 
I. '" . d b . . u 1c,n to po icy ,ormat1on ten s to e mcreasmg, although there are d 
d . h 1· f H . 1· ups an owns 10 t e me o progress. e 1s 1stened to more oft h 
h . . d h en t an form erl ~, wh~n . e_ 1s _recogm~e to a~e genuine expertise, and 
where hi s obJect1v1ty 1s es tabli shed. T hi s e nl arging influe nce 
·b·1· h . h Id H puts inc reased rcspo ns1 1 1t y o n 1s s ou ers. e must know what he is 
talking about. J lis wisdo~ must be sou~dly based on understoo d 
experience, and ~i s ad v~ce a nd ~~alys1s. must be f~ct~ally sup-
po rted in co n vinc ing fa shio n . The s ize of his opportunity 1s also the 
measure of hi s cha ll enge. 
The Focus of the Seq11e11ce 
Th rpose of this sequence is to conside r some of the policy e pu h" k. f h · 
. t·ves which do mina te the t in mg o t e nation , and which 
1mpe ra 1 . . . . 
mo ti vate c ritical gove rnme ntal prog1a ms. First to be considered 
are the o ldest impe rat ives. the nee_d to prevent and curta il crime , 
a nd to provide fo r nati o na l secunt y. Although the se goals have 
never been cr>111ple1ely realized for lo ng , it is esse ntial to contain 
vio lence. bo th do mestic and inte rnati o na l, within limits. in order 
tha t c ivilized soc iety may flouri sh. 
Next in thi s seque nce, a ttentio n turns to econo mic impera-
tives: the goal of "'full e mployment .. which was e tched in the nerve 
lV 
system of the nation by the "great depression" of the 1930's; the 
ambition to achieve endless prosperity through growth, an aspira-
tion of the 1950's and 1960's; the transition from "creeping" to 
"leaping" inflation in the 1970's; and the shocks of cumulative 
pollution and approaching exhaustion of resources, which stimu-
lated recognition of the need to restore and preserve the physical 
environment. The fact that the newly urgent necessities (to limit 
pollution and to economize in the use of energy), are at least in part 
the direct consequence of aggressive pursuance of the earlier eco-
nomic goals, makes the present dilemma the more confusing and 
difficult to accept. The nation, in a sense, has committed public 
officials to achieving goals, all of them "good" which nevertheless 
conflict. The public has a problem-but administrators will have to 
solve it, probably by meticulous and successive rational adjust-
ments of objectives, and of the myriad economic controls and 
incentives through which governments participate in the mixed 
economy of the 1980's. The success of these moves, of course, will 
depend upon effective communication to keep the public fully 
aware of the reality of problems faced and the administrative 
necessities to solve them. 
Finally in this sequence come the most emotion filled impera-
tives of all, the goals of escaping ignorance, poverty, sickness, and 
discrimination, and of providing equal opportunity for all men and 
women - opportunity for self fulfillment and achievement. The 
national programs which evolved at an increasing rate (but perhaps 
not always with adequate preparatory analysis and planning) came 
to constitute an almost bewildering array, involving national, state 
and local authorities. The operations of government have become 
peculiarly "federal". The goals to be attained are emotionally 
supported, elastic and open ended. The knowledge of causal fac-
tors is frequently inadequate, and there is a tendency to grasp 
quickly at remedies which have not been validated. 
The controversy over the social and human service functions 
which characterized the early 1970's was perhaps inevitable. But 
unfortunately for the prospects of a reasonable outcome, the public 
debate at the political level has not always been fact-based or 
rational. Assertions and allegations of either success or failure 
need to be supported (as frequently they have not been). So too 
does either rejection or adoption of methods of action, if there is to 
be clarification of policy and progress in performance. The goals 
V 
themselves seem to have been cha lle nged , a lbeit somewhat dis in-
genuous ly. The new line of ac tio n avowedly centers on me thods 
and agents of action : but the thrust of adminis tration policy in the 
early and mid 70s seemed to be (anomalously) toward curtailment 
of some programs a nd expansion of o the rs, but leaning toward 
curtailme nt. 
This s ituation highlights a s ignificant characteristic of the 
social imperatives. The goals a re Jess clearly defined, a nd possibly 
less easily defina ble than security or economic imperatives. The 
public commitment to them is less firm , _and response to remedial 
measures is frequently delayed. That is , a longer lead time is 
q · d " d. t take effect. The results also are Possi"bly re u1re ior reme 1es o 
more difficult to measure. 
The Outlook 
. . ursua nce of policy imperatives), and 
All m all , this a rea (the P_ mise to be emotionally ·1 th ·s f b · d · · t a t1on pro exc1 -
. 
1 
:ra o pu lie a mini s r_ ~nd adminis tratively critical. De-
m~, intellectually cha lleng ing. . t is not likely to abandon its 
~p1te vacillation, American socidemyinis trative experience to point 
rmpe f · much a . . 
ra 1ve goals . There 1s f more efficacious policies if it 
~he wa ~ ~o improved perform~n~~ 
0
o rganization , procedures and 
s mob1lrzed and listened to , a he needed high degree of coordi-
po"'."ers can be adjusted to secure t 1·ons of government , given a 
nation b d func r r etween programs an e the adjustment made. Wise 
Ittle time, pa tience and the will to i5e will be a n important factor in 
adnd farsighted lead;rship a t a ll Je ve ski·ng ahead from where we are 
eternf · LOO · d 
now Inrng the rate of progress. ha t over time, rn a emocratic 
soc-' and assuming (as we must) t spec t is no t gloomy - just 
tur~et,y, reason will prevail , th~ prho na tion 's his tory and public 
u ent Th. I . me in t e 
actrnin· · rs is a critica t1 f the act ion. 
rstrators are in the middle o 
lnstruc:r 
tons })1 t"cipa nts in the text a nd at th ease . to pa r I . f h 
..,_ e end f note the instructrons , each unrt o t e sequence. lhe o the . ent1 or . d 
0 tasl(8 . curriculum s ta t em f, . nformed JU gement based 
ti~~nowte~ssignect vary, but a ll call_ ~~~g, and realistic considera-
in or the i ge of the facts, c lear thin the work of government 
each rnpact f I forces o n Cl 
anc1 c Patti . o contextua . 1 ac tivity. ear analysis 
most ~ncise e~Pan~·~ area of professr~n~es are in vited and will be 
avorabi Posn1on in the commen a r 
Y regarded by the preceptors. 
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UNITl 
SECURITY, OR PROTECTIVE, 
FUNCTIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
A sense of the enduring importance of security, or protective, 
functions is suggested by their prominence in the basic national law 
of the United States. The preamble to the U.S. Constitution reads: 
"WE THE PEOPLE of the United States, in Order to form a more 
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic tranquility, pro-
vide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and 
secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do 
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of 
America." 
Those are the fundamental priorities. From efforts to achieve 
them have come living, evolving institutions which are the founda-
tion for daily governance, the foundation for the ability to live and 
work together in peace. In order for those foundations to be solid, 
so that the current generations may in turn meet their obligations to 
America's posterity, those constitutional priorities, and their pres-
ent institutional reflections deserve attention. 
Government's first responsibility is to protect people and their 
territory. Citizens must be and must feel secure from the threat of 
force against them, whether that threat is from an external enemy, a 
criminal within, or the government itself. Only when a peaceful, 
orderly framework exists can individuals subsume their interests 
into the general welfare, so that common energies, reinforcing 
rather than conflicting, can then be applied. Hence, the preamble's 
emphasis upon justice, tranquility and defense. When these three 
are reasonably assured, the citizenry can together promote the 
general welfare; combining the four can indeed secure the bless-
ings of liberty. 
But none of this is automatic. It must be achieved by men and 
women acting within institutions, and the people and the problems 
they confront are affected by contemporary conditions. 
The security functions which governments in the United 
States perform in order to protect people, their property, and their 
interests fall primarily into two areas: national security and crimi-
naljustice. In both areas, nongovernmental entities are also active; 
for example, steel companies import ore to make tanks, and elec-
tronics firms market anti-burglary devices. But the basic responsi-
bility for national security is borne by the federal government, and 
for criminal justice by state governments. At various times in 
history, neither of these security functions was an immediately 
pressing concern, but even at those happy times there were signifi-
cant numbers of Americans engaged in keeping the peace. Now 
and for the foreseeable future, however, both security functions 
are consistently at or near the very top of the public agenda, and 
together they engage the efforts of about fifteen percent of em-
ployed Americans. 
Actually, national security has been of high priority in the 
decades from the 1940"s to the present, and contineus to be impera-
tive. In these busy decades, the United States has fought three 
foreign wars, accepted reluctantly the leadership of the Free 
World, multiplied enormously the extent of its diplomatic and 
political activity abroad, and developed an unprecedented degree 
of economic interdependence with other countries. After the devi-
si ve war in Vietnam and the convulsions of Watergate, the nation 
tried for a period to turn somewhat away from external concerns. 
However, the events in Iran, Afghanistan, the Middle East and in 
the SA lT II ncgot iat ions, reawakened public consciousness of 
how important were such corn.:crns. In the 1980's, the American 
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people will be much involved with important problems and issues 
in the national security field. 
The criminal justice area on the other hand, had attracted 
only relatively ~uperficial and 'sporadic attention fro~ the Ame~-
can people untll the rates of violent crime soared m the 1960 s. 
People then became alarmed about crime in the streets. They 
avoided the central cities, especially at night, and put extr~ locks 
on their doors. Political leaders resonated to the ever shriller, 
louder cries for '"law and order" and ifracist code words may have 
sometimes been involved, it was al~o ciear that the loudest cries 
were coming from Blacks, who were the main victims and wanted 
better protection. The potential damage which fear and violence 
might do to social cohesion and prospects for democratic govern-
ment became clear to many people. Major efforts, therefore, were 
made by all levels of government in the late t960's and the 1970's to 
improve the situation. Throughout this period, public opinion sur-
vey after survey consistently showed the crime problem to be the 
foremost concern of the general public. Only as economic prob-
lems worsened in late 1978 did crime slip from first place on the list. 
Even so, it remains a crucial rpoblem and promises to continue as 
such for years to come. 
Achieving even relative security in both areas abounds with 
difficult problems. Some of these difficulties are much in the public 
eye and are often discussed with passion. Other problems are 
visible only to the experienced, perceptive specialist, even though 
some of these may be even more important to the nation ·s future 
tranquility and security than problems which get headlines. Impa-
tient people, and some political leaders, grasp for quick and easy 
answers, become frustrated easily, and tend to look for devils to 
blame. There is a constant temptation toward single-factor 
analysis, explaining everything in terms of just one element in a 
situation which in fact is intricately complex. Public administrators 
who themselves are not fully immune to such tendencies, need to 
keep them particularly in mind. 
For, given the importance of these problems and the amount of 
attention which governments give them, it is rather unlikely that 
any of them are simple to explain or easy to resolve. Before they 
can be really understood, considerable data must be gathered and 
grasped, with much use of concepts of cause and effect. Before 
policies or actions of any value can be selected, extensive analysis 
3 
I: 
-----~-=~~ 
-, 
·b·1· . t ct people and their Government's first respons1 1 1ty 1s to pro e t f 
territory. Citizens must be and must feel secure from the threa 0 
force against them, whether that threat is from an external enemy, a 
criminal within, or the government itself. Only when a peaceful, 
orderly framework exists can individuals subsume their intere~ts 
into the general welfare, so that common energies, reinforci~g 
rather than conflicting, can then be applied. Hence, the preambles 
emphasis upon justice, tranquility and defense. When these three 
are reasonably assured, the citizenry can together promote the 
general welfare; combining the four can indeed secure the bless-
ings of liberty. 
But none of this is automatic. It must be achieved by men and 
women acting within institutions, and the people and the problems 
they confront are affected by contemporary conditions. 
The security functions which governments in the United 
States perform in order to protect people, their property, and their 
interests fall primarily into two areas: national security and crimi-
naljustice. In both areas, nongovernmental entities are also active; 
for example, steel companies import ore to make tanks, and elec-
tronics firms market anti-burglary devices. But the basic responsi-
bility for national security is borne by the federal government, and 
for criminal justice by state governments. At various times in 
history, neither of these security functions was an immediately 
pressing concern, but even at those happy times there were signifi-
cant numbers of Americans engaged in keeping the peace. Now 
and for the foreseeable future, however, both security functions 
are consistently at or near the very top of the public agenda, and 
together they engage the efforts of about fifteen percent of em-
ployed Americans. 
Actually, national security has been of high priority in the 
decades from the 1940's to the present, and contineus to be impera-
tive. In these busy decades, the United States has fought three 
foreign wars, accepted reluctantly the leadership of the Free 
World, multiplied enormously the extent of its diplomatic and 
political activity abroad, and developed an unprecedented degree 
of economic interdependence with other countries. After the de vi-
sive war in Vietnam and the convulsions of Watergate, the nation 
tried for a period to turn somewhat away from external concerns. 
However, the events in Iran, Afghanistan, the Middle East and in 
the SALT II negotiations, reawakened public consciousness of 
how important were such concerns. In the 1980's, the American 
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people will be much involved with important problems and issues 
in the national security field. 
The criminal justice area, on the other hand, had attracted 
only relatively superficial and sporadic attention from the Ameri-
can people until the rates of violent crime soared in the 1960's. 
People then became alarmed about crime in the streets. They 
avoided the central cities, especially at night, and put extra locks 
on their doors. Political leaders resonated to the ever shriller, 
louder cries for .. law and order" and, ifracist code words may have 
sometimes been involved, it was also clear that the loudest cries 
were coming from Blacks, who were the main victims and wanted 
better protection. The potential damage which fear and violence 
might do to social cohesion and prospects for democratic govern-
ment became clear to many people. Major efforts, therefore, were 
made by all levels of government in the late 1960's and the 1970's to 
improve the situation. Throughout this period, public opinion sur-
vey after survey consistently showed the crime problem to be the 
foremost concern of the general public. Only as economic prob-
lems worsened in late 1978 did crime slip from first place on the list. 
Even so, it remains a crucial rpoblem and promises to continue as 
such for years to come. 
Achieving even relative security in both areas abounds with 
difficult problems. Some of these difficulties are much in the public 
eye and are often discussed with passion. Other problems are 
visible only to the experienced, perceptive specialist, even though 
some of these may be even more important to the nation ·s future 
tranquility and security than problems which get headlines. Impa-
tient people, and some political leaders, grasp for quick and easy 
answers, become frustrated easily, and tend to look for devils to 
blame. There is a constant temptation toward single-factor 
analysis, explaining everything in terms of just one element in a 
situation which in fact is intricately complex. Public administrators 
who themselves are not fully immune to such tendencies, need to 
keep them particularly in mind. 
For, given the importance of these problems and the amount of 
attention which governments give them, it is rather unlikely that 
any of them are simple to explain or easy to resolve. Before they 
can be really understood, considerable data must be gathered and 
grasped, with much use of concepts of cause and effect. Before 
policies or actions of any value can be selected, extensive analysis 
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is essential, involving consideration of alternatives and the conse-11.1.1.•.•.1: 
quences, including side effects which are likely to follow. '!j\ 
, h d d 111 Yet these are not impenetrable mysteries to be compre en e ,'Ji)'; 
only by specialists, if at all. The generalist who approaches p~ob-'.!!/ 
lems and issues in either national security or criminal justice m a1 (, 
professional manner can penetrate these matters to some degree, if.;_:: 
he or she wishes, and takes time to do so. ' 
As in all areas of public administration, professional analysis 
is essential with regard to the security, or protective, functions. 
Problems and issues in these areas must be considered analytically ' 
.in order to deal with reality and to determine the wise course of . · 
action. The points discussed before are elementary in professional ' 
analysis and should be kept in mind. 
Keys to Professional Analysis 
To master the professional approach of a public administration 
generalist is of course an objective of the three-year Nova DPA 
program; at this early state in it, one ought no to expect high 
competence. But now is not too soon to begin looking analytically 
at problems and issues. The following points are basic to doing so 
in a professional fashion: 
CAUSE AND EFFECT: Public administration involves people 
and organized groups of people. Although ~he way they behave is 
not random nor often capricious, neither 1s there perfect und _ 
· b h · Tc d" er, standing of how to predict the1r e. av1or. o pre 1ct requires em-
ploying concepts of what cause will produce what effect. Some-
times uncertainty suggests using several a!te~native cause-and-
effect concepts in parallel analyses. Analysis 1s poor which uses 
such concepts unconsciously, leaving most of them unstated, un-
recognized, and implicit; for it is prone to error. Professional 
analysis which identifies explicitly the causal concepts being used, 
so far as possible is less likely to err. 
THE FACTS: To collect and comprehend enough of the rele-
vant facts is a prior necessity for sound analysis. Since facts often 
come packaged in viewpoint, especially when important policy 
issues are at stake, discriminating judgment must be applied to 
them. If several different viewpoints can be consulted, mutual 
correction may result, although occasionaJiy, adversaries may 
share a common misunderstanding. Unless time-urgency truly 
demands it, the professional generalist never substitutes his own 
general awareness for the more current, more specific knowledge 
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obtainable from expert sources. Neither does he take expert con-
tributions at face value, however; but instead, he applies the crit-
ical tests of experience and common sense. 
CLINICAL OBJECTIVITY: One's own viewpoint, policy pref-
erences, and even emotions can act as filters, which distort how 
one perceives facts and which thus obstruct clear understanding. 
To perceive objectively requires recognizing one's own particular 
biases. It is professional to deal with data objectively and clinically. 
DIVIDING FOR MANAGEABILITY: Even very complex issues 
can be analytically penetrated and divided into parts which are of 
manageable size. To break apart an issue is to permit concentrated 
attention to the adequacy of data and casual concepts, the exis-
tence of implicit assumptions, and the presence of routes toward 
resolution, with respect to each component part. The alternative to 
thus decomposing a complex question is to treat it impressionisti-
cally and intuitively, which lowers the likelihood of success. The 
professional way is to analyze. 
DYNAMIC ANALYSIS: Most analysis in public administration 
is dynamic analysis. Hardly anything an administrator is really 
interested in rests in stable equilibrium, and the administrator 
usually seeks ways to change it for the better. Dynamic analysis 
focuses on interactions and usually involves alternatives. fre-
quently for choosing among various options for action or policy. By 
using data and concepts of cause and effect, the professional tries 
to visualize what would be the consequences and the implications 
of each option, for this permits comparison and a sounder basis for. 
choice. 
PROBLEMS AND ISSUES: The importance of objective 
analysis should be kept in mind as the two topic areas of Unit 2.1 
are considered. The intent here is to take note of some of the main 
••problems" and .. issues". The discussion below will assume a 
basic difference between these two concepts. A problem is taken to 
be a rather enduring obstacle which lies between the individual and 
the attainment of his broad objectives. Ways around it may be 
found, or ways to ameliorate its ill effects may be discovered. but 
the problem cannot be finally .. solved". that is, it will not disap-
pear. The existence of such a problem is widely accepted. although 
different people might describe it in somewhat different terms. An 
issue, by contrast, is a matter which needs decision: What public 
action, if any, should be taken? Agreement may be narrower about 
how to define the issue, or even about whether such an issue really 
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·d d or 
exists . In any case , an issue is relatively transie nt ; on_ce deci e -~ a 
set aside , it will be succeeded by other issues, hke steps 1 
journey. . he 
Public debate is ordinarily about issues , but occurs against t 
backdrop of problems . Contending parties often describe that 
backdrop differently, for either perceptual or tactical reasons. 
Among thoughtful professionals, however, the priority goes to 
correct identification of the problems, so that those issues can then 
be chosen which , when resolved, will make the most worthwhile 
contribution. As Ma ry Parker Follett explained so ma ny years ago , 
early and accura te identification of the proble m is a most important 
step in avoiding frustrating conflict over issues , and in reaching 
agreement among inte rested pa rties as to the wise course of action. 
This the me runs through her essays on Dynamic Administration, 
which you will read in Seque nce 4.1, "Organization and Ma nage-
me nt Principles" . They will repay careful study. 
NATIONAL SECURITY 
What Is It ? 
The term " national security" is not prec· s . . 
in differe nt senses. It is used here simply b 
I 
e, a nd 1s interpreted 
·1 . . . ecause no bett m . 
ava1 able . What 1t signifies is the supre mely funda e r ter . 15 
of protecti ng the Ame rican people a nd t . mental function 
erntory d . · · 
abroad from foreign injury. Obviously .1. • a n act1v1t1es 
. . m, ttary fore d th . 
operations a re involved , but the function a d h es a n eir 
more tha n that. Diplo matic and inte rna tiona; ~- ~ te rm ~~ver far 
vital parts in na tio na l security, a nd interna tio pol ttica\ ac~1V1ty ?1~Y 
. . . . n . I na economic actlVtty 
11, 1nc rc Hs 111gly 1n uc nt1 a . In preve nting war the . . 
. . . . . . . , nation tnes to 
mwnlnin mil 1l ary l: f1 pabil1t1cs whic h will make unattractive the idea 
of a flacking !he United ~!ales. But_ the na tion also tries to for:see 
, I lo rc!-!olvc int c rn at1o nal te ns ions, and to create situauons 
£ll1L. , h deter 01 he r l:Ount rics from considering ~he use of force. H~re 
~ hie . rna tional political a nd economic measures , appl~ed 
is whe_re inte d ·th the he lp of diploma tic activity, make maJor, 
a nd ~e 1~for~~n1 ~l~ut io ns to na tio nal security. And an indispensab\11~ 
c nnt1n u1ng c < . . d b US f · n inte t-
i I · ,·t)n tri hu t io n to a ll thi s 1s ma e y .. ore1g unL e r y 111 14 ~ 
g c n c c ac ti v iti c~ . 
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For present purposes, then, ··national security" comprehends 
the work of the State and Defense departments, the military ser-
vices, the Agency for International Development, the CIA, and 
much of what the rreasury Department does. Scores of other 
agencies also contribute, such as the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion, the FBI, and NASA. 
The White House manages the national security function, 
making substantial use of the National Security staff, headed by 
the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, as 
well as of the executive departments and agencies. A dozen or so 
congressional committees are continuously involved, plus others 
intermittently. Coordination of all this is a highly developed, but 
occasionally imperfect, art. 
In addition to these central agencies and figures, throughout 
not just the federal government but the society at large, are many, 
many others with some involvement in national security. Manufac-
turing industries, communications companies, agricultural exper-
imenters, think tanks, the U.S. Olympic Committee, and wheat 
farmers are among them. The degree of government influence on 
what they do may range from slight to zero. Nevertheless, the 
persons responsible for national security must at least be aware of 
how these nongovernmental entities may be affecting the national 
security situation, and sometimes may need to encourage, sub-
sidize, educate, or divert one or another-within the rather narrow 
limits of applicable law. 
Here is one of the great differences between this nation and 
many others. What is done abroad by organizations and most 
individuals from the Soviet Union, East Germany, China, or Viet-
nam-whether trade missions, scientists, or athletes-is done for 
national purposes, and is supervised and controlled (sometimes 
imperfectly) by the government which sends them. But the U.S. 
government puts very few restrictions, perhaps mostly taxation-
related, upon what missionaries, computer companies, or the Har-
lem Globetrotters do outside the U.S. It most certainly does not 
use them for state purposes, even though they may generate good-
will, foreign exchange, or other benefits. Between these two ex-
tremes lie many gradations in the focused use for national purposes 
of activity abroad. Even some of America's close allies exercise 
some control over such activity by their citizens, and more control 
is attempted by many Third World countries. What is pertinent 
here is that, while national security is affected both negatively and 
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positively by nongovernmental activity abroad, American notions 
~ffreedom cause the U.S. to abstain from marshaling and control-
hng the activities of American citizens toward national goals. 
Some Pertinent Concepts 
What national security includes can be seen in another 
perspective by noting a few of the main concepts within the field. 
Most of these terms are used loosely and imprecisely in genera} 
discussion and in the press, while specialists usually define them 
far more rigorously than do the brief characterizations which fol-
low. 
Consider, for instance the two terms national interests and 
vital interests. Both denote' whatever a nation judges it must pro-
tect from foreign-originated harm, in order to ensure the nation's 
well-being. There is a grave distinction, however, which average 
newspaper readers (and sometimes writers) may overlook. For a 
vital interest is perceived as all but indispensable to survival, and 
hence something the nation would fight to preserve. It is worth-
while for the reader to reflect for a moment about what items he or 
she would list among U.S. vital interests. (No two lists are likely to 
be identical, nor would the lists of a group of national security 
specialists.) 
The concept of deterrence has spawned a massive literature in 
~he past 20 or 30 years, but the basic approach is an ancient one. It 
1s to dissuade hostile action by causing a potential aggressor to see 
the likelihood that effective counteraction would bring greater 
costs than gains. Now that catastrophically destructive nuclear 
weapons are so abundant, and the modes of using them are so 
varied, scores of variant expressions - graduated deterrence, fi-
nite deterrence, conventional deterrence, mutual assured destruc-
tion, credible deterrence, stable deterrence, and so on - have 
come to be used. Each such expression is usually shorthand for a 
long and tightly reasoned set of abstractions, but all have to do with 
discouraging attack. 
. A term often heard during the 1970s was balance of power. 
~mce school days most Americans have understood this as an 
1?ternational system in which one power shifts its policy or al-
liances so as to reinforce first one group of nations and then a 
somewhat different group, simply to keep any one power-grouping 
from gaining dominance or undertaking aggression. Yet some 
people interpret the term to mean a dead-even, neck-and-neck 
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situation of U.S. and Soviet power; since many of these Americans 
want the U.S. stronger than the USSR, the concept is repugnant to 
them. Besides these two interpretations, another five or six are 
also occasionally found. 
Imperialism is a long-standing concept recently used with 
several new twists in politically purposeful ways. It has meant the 
control by one state over other peoples, often distant, who thus 
experience alien rule and probably economic exploitation. For 
most Americans, it is difficult to conceive how the relationship 
between the USSR and, say, East Germany is not precisely that. 
Yet it is Americans, who invented decolonization and-to be blunt 
-imposed it on European allies, who are called imperialists by the 
Soviets. No doubt they have in mind American economic activity 
in, for example, Latin America. Some antiwar protesters in the 
1960s called the U.S. government imperialist, too, saying that it 
prevented the Vietnamese people from choosing who should gov-
ern them. The term was neutral or even positive early in the 
century, but now it is clearly pejorative. 
A principle especially urged by the U.S. isfree trade, or the 
absence of governmental interference with normal free-market 
commerce across international boundaries. Even though the U.S. 
is dependent upon imports in some critical areas, international 
trade is far less important to it than to nations such as Japan and 
Britain - or even Venezuela. Domestic pressures are no less felt 
here than elsewhere: just as Japanese auto manufacturers want no 
foreign penetration of their markets, so also do American shoe 
manufacturers and unions want insulation from low-cost competi-
tion from abroad. When such pressures are too strong for a central 
government to withstand, various measures of protectionism are 
applied. These may be import quotas, high tariffs, export sub-
sidies, minimum price controls, or some other subtle barriers, but 
their purpose is to protect the markets of domestic producers. 
How Is It Changing? 
Until the late 1960s, national security matters were considered 
to have two main components. One was diplomatic or political, 
while the other was the defense or military component. Major 
changes, however, have made the inclusion of an economic and a 
domestic component quite frequent as well. 
International economic questions, it is true, had on previous 
occasions entered the national security area. In the early 1960s, for 
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· h Os. 
adverse, t e ·ps 
example, when its balance of payments ~a~ American tro0 e 
induced Germany to pay some costs of stationing . 8 proving t~ 
there But such exceptions were treated as exceptionle,ss but quite 
· · · the grace d --rule that national secunty was - to use t involve 
accurate name of the State Department elemen e 
politico-military. . curitY, bad cofll d 
By 1980, the economic content of national se b t major an 
to be neither minor nor occasional, as ~efore, ubad been th; 
continuious. Contributing principally to this chanr:r imported?~_ : 
problem of oil supply from abroad. The demand d the pohtl · 
had grown rapidly while costs had risen even faster an al 00favor-
cal milieu of overseas supply sources had taken sevt es in pro- · 
able turns. An aggravated domestic inflation, d~c tn natiooal~Y 
ductivity, ~nd the diminished role of the U.S. d~llar inter ecooo~1~ 
had combined to erode foreign confidence in 1! :5 · 1 55ertive 
strength. One consequence was the increasing pohtIC~ a wo eco-
ness of certain allies seeking better protection of thetr O shiP in 
nomic futures, which somewhat obstructed U.S. Iead~f pursu-
politica\ and defense matters. American leverage abroad 1~ (.)tiotl 
· h 1· · · ohfer"' mg sue po 1c1es as discouraging nuclear weapons pr the 
had been eroded by the continued growth of alternatives to oiC 
U .s_. as supplier of, for example, steel, trucks, and ele_c!r~on-
eqmpment. Meanwhile, the threat of adverse or even hosttl ·ng 
trol over ~ources of oil for key allies and the u .S. itself was grow• 
more ommous. d 
. e 
Increasingly one saw economic matters becoming interJ111~ _ 
' . t ' I'ttCO in s1tuat1ons or ransact,ons which formerly were only po t _ 
military. Moreover, the number of defense and foreign policy ques 
tions activated by economic factors had risen sharply. . 
Domestic. considerations also had intermittently figured tfl 
national securtty areas, but much less so than today. Before the tate 
1960s, appropriations for defense and especially foreign aid h~d 
usually been resisted to a degree b~ groups advocating domestt~ 
expenditure; there ~ere always factions urging this policy or that, 
and sensitivity to airplane contracts and base closures was atwaY5 
keen. But the support whi~h th~ ~ublic and the Congress had givetl 
to the Executive Branch s pohc1es and programs in the natioflal 
security area for 30 years had been remarkably broad, remarkablY 
consistent. b t' \ 
. . 1980 however, there was su stan ,a and unceasiOi 
By_ '. , · t upon executive branch freedom ofl 
domestic constram 
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national security matters. This applied whether the executive pre-
ferred a more active or a more passive policy, whether more foreign 
aid was proposed or less. The reason was not better public under-
standing of the national security field, for actually the public's 
attention to it had declined. But the public, often influenced by 
small activist groups, no longer assumed contentedly that the 
proper authorities would act wisely in the public behalf. Instead 
one often saw an assertive insistence that responsible authority 
was likely to be either wrong or wrongheaded. While proliferating 
interest groups urged their single views, and the media stressed the 
negatives about government, the Congress was quick to resonate 
and then to legislate some new encroachment upon the Executive's 
discretion. However much this seemed the normal working of 
pluralist democracy, many professionals believed it had been so 
exaggerated in the national security area during the 1970s that it 
often seriously harmed the public's true interests. 
The turnaround of national policy on Vietnam persuaded 
many people that orchestrated protests and media manipulation 
could gain success for views initiaIIy held by only a few. In a tumult 
of revelations about conduct in Southeast Asia and the Watergate 
scandals, the .. Imperial Pesidency" was denounced, the term .. na-
tional security" took on a bad odor, the CIA's secrets and sources 
were exposed, and much legislation sought to eliminate all oppor-
tunity for federal sin. As turnover in Congress increased, new 
members hastened to respond to the reformist temper of the times. 
Congress repeatedly intervened and upset delicate international 
settlements such as those for the Greek-Turkish conflict in Cyprus, 
U .S.-Soviet trade, and, very nearly, the Panama Canal Treaties. 
As Congress's power grew and economic issues became more 
important, domestic pressures for economic protectionism inten-
sified. Scores of constituencies sought federal action to ward off 
foreign economic competition, whether from Japanese steel, 
Czechoslovak shoes, or whatever. The Executive, certain that free 
trade greatly advances the national interest, and intent upon 
eliminating hurtful protectionism by the Japanese and others, 
found these domestic pressures incessant, erosive, and all but 
impossible to withstand. 
Since legislation and appropriations by the Congress establish 
the framework within which national security can be pursued. and 
since interest groups ride ever closer herd on the Congress and its 
multiplied staffs, the executive branch found that most national 
security issues involved a significant domestic component. 
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Why Is Security Increasing In Importance? 
(lfl" \ 
. d to rnake I 
The circumstances of the t980s seem destine ;\rnericatl , 
tional security matters more prominent than ever on t~en and ~e 
· · tuatto ' 10 , 
scene. Perhaps the chief reason is the Sov1~t st ·te efforts. . 
second was U.S. uncertainty in interpreting it. Desp~s steadt~~ 
the early 1970s toward detente, the USSR h buildups 1 
·i· · Its ~1,e 
strengthened and extended its military capabt tt~e~ · d because w 
nuclear missiles and naval power had been pubhcize h0 we"~!, 
USSR was formerly well below U.S. levels in both. :N°"';he S0"1et . 
terms like parity and equivalence were applied, _Yet bad alWa~S 
growth continued apace. In ground forces, the Sov!ets d capabil"' 
been the leader, but even here the same growth in size a~ rnilita.!Y 
ity was occurring. Why the USSR continued to increase its c1ear.1° 
power at high cost to a sore-pressed civil economy was not f ve ei"' 
the U.S., there was contention about the various a1terna 
1
curit}', 
l . S fi r se ..... 11. P anations. ome people still saw a defensive quest O ·tartiV' 
others spoke about bureaucratic politics within an a~thOfl d stiU 
government _whose military component was influential, an 01ucll 
ot~er~ pe:ived an offensive motivation-foreseeing nolt s;ilitafi 
ac ua w are as the indirect 1· . f werfu ~11." leverage toward r . app icat1on o po ld NfecV· 
while, another PP~ i:cal adv~nces throughout the wor . c1eatli 
imminent, bringi:~o m~~ Soviet le~dership transition wainitY fo! 
misadventure. uncertamty and more opport 
..... _ . . ce 
uans1t1ons elsewhere ter pa 
than usual. Yugoslavia wou~:emed likely to occur at a f~s ht create 
real hazards. Iran had not s~?n undergo one which oug dershil' 
and policies seemed likely :,c ieved stability. China's .tea agaifl· 
The Middle East was far from :a~~ through volatile periods pell"' 
ing at an increasing rate in Afria e. Violent changes were haP ges, 
the Soviets or Cubans had been ci~ 1~ a number of these cbaO ciO' 
for long·range projection of milita.rvo Ved, showing a new ca.Pa 
h · Y Power At t e same time, the overall to · itY 
situation was distinctly negative, at: of .the American sec0~ 0 ... 
tently divided as a nation, the U .s. w~~d~n the short tertn· aocl 
watched the Communist North conquer theesw from Vietnam ·c~ 
Th outh which Amert had pledged to support. ereafter U.S. allies el h 1 ger . . sew ere no on 
perceived Amenca 10 the same way they had before. The CountrY 
suffered the protracted agony of Watergate, and the passions 
aroused by it and by Vietnam led to reducing the foreign inte)li, 
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gence system, possibly the world's best, to near impotence. As the 
U.S. stumbled into a largely self-inflicted inflation, the price of oil 
was abruptly quadrupled, causing economic convulsions and ap-
parently enduring harm to the world's perception of U.S. economic 
leadership. Many other factors were also involved, but the dollar 
so declined that its status as the world's reserve currency came into 
doubt. Then, having abolished nonvoluntary military service, the 
U.S. cut its armed forces to a size supportable by volunteers and 
dropped the defense budget to the lowest percentage of GNP since 
the post-World War II demobilization. Meanwhile the Congress 
asserted itself in foreign policy so often and so forcefully as to 
create doubt abroad about the ability of any president to conduct a 
coherent national security policy. Many observers said that the 
nation's foreign affairs establishment had suffered a .. failure of 
nerve." In recognizing at last that the U.S. was not omnipotent in 
world affairs, Americans generally seemed to have fallen nearly to 
the despairing view that America could do nothing, that nothing 
was really worth trying. 
But in mid-1979, a great debate began to shape up, and prom-
ised to refocus public attention upon national security. The SACT II 
agreements and the constitutional requirement for Senate action 
on them provided the occasion, but the debate seemed sure to 
continue long after that action was complete. A year earlier the 
Panama Canal Treaties had raised the activity levels, and then the 
so-called •• Arc of Crisis" (Angola, Zaire, Somalia, Ethiopia, Af-
ghanistan, Yemen, and, resoundingly, Iran) had erupted, bringing 
new energy problems as well as discontents about American inef-
fectiveness abroad. Some opponents of SALT II had long been 
organized and active, while the news media had been increasing 
the coverage of the U .S.-Soviet relationship. There was even the 
beginning of some open discussion of how best to man the armed 
services. 
Levels of consciousness about national security, already ris-
ing, seemed bound to be further stimulated by the SALT debates. 
Public attitudes, apparently more concerned and more supportive 
of defense increases than the Congress generally, seemed likely to 
become more manifest and presumably would be reflected in 
Washington. But to reach national consensus on new nuclear 
weapons strategies, on how to man the services, and on a host of 
other national security questions would surely require more than 
just a year or two. The prospect therefore seemed to be for some 
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years of higher intensity attention to national security and signifi-
cantly increased appropriations for defense. 
Considering the national economy's visible prospects, gov-
ernment spending for nonsecurity purposes could thus be expected 
to decline proportionately. Hence the impact of national security 
upon public administrators seemed apt to increase. 
NATIONAL SECURITY PROBLEMS 
Against that background, several of the most basic of the 
enduring problems in this field will be considered. In the next 
section, some of the current issues before the nation in the early 
1980s will be noted, but it is first necessary to identify the problem 
areas from which they arise. 
THE Nothing else remotely compares to the human and so .. 
NUCLEARcial destruction which could come through unrestrained 
HAZARD nuclear war. The U.S. and the Soviet Union both pos .. 
sess many thousands of nuclear weapons aimed today at each 
other, and if used they could cause scores-perhaps hundreds-of 
millions of casualties. Several other nations have small nuclear 
arsenals as well. While some analysts suggest that very limited 
nuclear conflict is feasible, many strategists and political leaders 
?elieve the profound uncertainties of escalation m_ak~ this m?st 
imprudent to consider. The dangers and the uncertamti~s do bnng 
some security, as Bernard Brodie explained in his class1~ War and 
Politics, and there are some positive factors: fewer ~at1ons ~ave 
mad d t t men are mcreasmgly 
e nuclear weapons than was feare , s a es . 
soph · · 1 b tt' nence durmg con-fl" •sticated, and precedents for nuc ear a s 
ict exist. 
N 'JI h World government is ~vertheless, the weapons are st1 t ere. SALT II t-
co:t 10 prospect, nor is nuclear disarmament. The . 1~~1 or e and the presently visible prospects for SALT Ill promise ~ e 
s· no reduction in the physical capacity for mutual devastation. , 
a Ince misunderstanding and irrationality are not totally unknown 
rn~ng the world's statesmen even Brodie judged that unre-
strain d ' 
e nuclear war was still a live risk. 
h Most Americans seldom remember that risk. however. They ave e 'd · · es eve vi ently learned to live with it. Only during great ens 
rn ry decade or so have they momentarily realized how enor-
ousiy greater is this nuclear hazard than the total of all the other 
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risks that normally engage their attention. Whatever the public's 
mental block, however, the U.S. government must keep the nu-
clear threat constantly in mind. For government's most fundamen-
tal duty is to make the chances for general nuclear war ever more 
remote. 
A Intensifying the nuclear hazard is the fact that ten-
TURBULENTsions among nations are frequent, but no orderly 
WORLD system exists to resolve them. There have been his-
torical periods when international conflict was routinely resolved 
without significant armed violence. Following each World War 
there was brief hope that another such period might emerge. In 
fact, the prime objective of U.S. policy for over a generation now 
has been what President Kennedy called "a peaceful world com-
munity of free and independent states, free to choose their own 
future and their own system so long as it does not threaten the 
freedom of others." Gratifying progress is visible in the former 
West European cockpit. Elsewhere, new nationalisms, political 
violence, and accelerated ferment have contributed to making 
armed conflict more frequent than ever. Despite sustained U.S. 
efforts, the world still lacks an assured mechanism for resolving 
problems among nations without violence. Several times a year the 
U.S. must weigh the obvious advantages of noninvolvement in a 
conflict elsewhere against the potential long-run effects on the 
chances for a larger and possibly a nuclear war. The security of 
Americans is what causes the U.S. government to pay attention to 
conflicts between Arabs and Israel, India and Pakistan, Vietnam 
and Cambodia, Angola and Zaire. 
THE Led initially by the U.S., all industrialized na-
DEVELOPMENT tions have come to recognize that their own 
GAP national interests require them to help the 
less-developed countries advance economically. There has been 
encouraging progress in development, plus vivid success for such 
countries as Brazil, South Korea, Mexico, and Taiwan. But some 
of the poorer countries see the gap between the industrialized 
nations and themselves as widening rather than closing. They have 
begun banding together to some extent to increase their pressure 
on the West, for the changes in how they think have outpaced the 
changes in how they live. The result is, as Zbigniew Brzebinski 
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expJ · 
arned in a 1973 F. . . . , 
ness of global in .0 n-'tgn Affmrs article • .. a heightened aware~ 
Inte · eguahty and · . 
ns1fied soc· 1 an mcreased determination to erase !f• quences " Sia and global animosity are bound to be the cons~ fi · · · ome t · · 
. rustrations of pro ess1onals are concerned lest the economic 
Into an unwantsodme Poorer countries might one day pull the U.S~ 
e war. 
ECONOMIC N . ! 
CONFLICT etthe~ steady nor spasmodic economic leverage is 
something e new to international relations, but the 1970s brought 
Arab manip;en. closer ~o economic warfare waged in peacetime. 
but not th atton of od supplies and prices is the most dramatic 
flourished ~h o~Jy example. As economic interdependence has 
dependen/ u : Ind~strialized nations have grown more and more 
rna?ipuJated t n Pnmary products general_Jy. On~ now sees these 
While indust . Y. the Jess-developed countries which supply them, 
1'he ingred· naJized nations scramble to reduce their vulnerability. 
to do seri tents are now at hand for a nation, or a group of nations, 
llleans un~h~s economic harm deliberately to others. It is by no 
treznes tnkabJe that economic warfare pushed toward ex-
, couJd bring on armed conflict. ' 
coNGRe I 
CONST SSIONAL The American President was on a shorter 
THe E AAINT OF tether in national security affairs during 
As ranc XECUTfVE the 1970s than during the 1950s and 1960s. 
from Vie~r and distrust surged into the American political system 
sively, an~am and Watergate, the Congress asserted itself aggres~ 
Constitut· a stabJe equilibrium has not yet been reached. The, 
Pri 10n ass· d ·1· ,..~ lllarily t 1&ns responsibility for foreign an nu 1tary auairs 
~ew limits ~;he ~esident, but the Congress h~s legislate~ sorne 
lJalanced resof~StdentiaJ powers. It also has disrupted dehcateJy 
OthS·-Soviet tr~hon~ of the Greek-Turkish _d~sp~te in <?yprus, the 
"" ers. 13y re de Situation and u s pohc1es m Afnca, amonn 
4
•,any lJ VeaJi ' • • • • ~~ Se -S. int u· ng secret intelligence matters, it has dned up 
Na~~t0 riaJ co:r. igence sources. It has even been thrusting toward 1ona1 s •rrnati s · 1 A · t W . ecunt on of the President's pecia ss1s ant for 
ha hiJe it · Y Affairs Ve lirn. is bey . 
doubt th lted the n .0 nd doubt that these Congressional shackles 
was es at ~ollle P:hon's effectiveness abroad, it is equally beyond 
noting ~~ntia1 ifpu~?ounced reaction to the "Imperial Presidency" 
at con&res~~ trust was ever to be restored. It also is worth 
tonal staffs have been greatly increased and 
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h~ve a vested interest in activism. They and the Members espe-
cially have been subjected increasingly to rather intense pressures 
from single-issue interest groups, as well. 
Nevertheless, in the national security area, the Congress has 
gone too far. Unless some of the President's authority and freedom 
of action are restored, the U.S. performance in the national sec-
urity area will suffer. 
NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES 
The above problems are intensely durable, although they may 
change in intensity. One way to ease them is through careful choice 
of the issues on which to act. The issues listed below are likely to be 
prominent during the early 1980s. 
U.S. RELATIONSHIPS Besides the U.S., there is only one 
WITH GREAT POWERS other superpower, the Soviet Union. 
How the U.S. should relate to it is the central element in our 
national security policy. In the 1970s, the themes of detente and 
arms limitation were prominent. Considerable Soviet involvement 
in such conflicts as Angola, Somalia-Ethiopia, and Vietnam-
Cambodia went essentially unanswered. But as SAIT II came 
before the public eye, there was much apprehensiveness over the 
sustained high pace of Soviet arms programs, which seemed well in 
excess of defensive needs, and over the new projecting of Soviet 
military power abroad. U .S.-Soviet trade remained at lower levels 
than had once been expected, but it did include the export of some 
advanced U.S. technology. There were some American voices 
calling for a sterner U.S. stance toward the USSR, but also many 
which insisted that sustained, even increased communication with 
the Soviets promised better prospects for lasting peace. 
With her 960 million people, China may one day become a 
superpower. Her economy is scarcely modem, and whether 
further volatility of her leadership and policies will occur is still 
uncertain. But the USSR is acutely sensitive to China's ponderous, 
if ill-equipped, military forces - which do include some nuclear 
weapons - and is clearly apprehensive about any cooperation 
between the U.S. and China. In restoring its long-severed relation-
ships with China, the U.S. has been attentive not only to the 
Sino-Soviet situation but also to China's natural gravitational at-
traction toward nearby oil-hungry Japan. 
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Pe are I d W stern Euro \ Alliance and cooperation with Japan an e h ve beenfo!a 
at the heart of U.S. national security p~licy, as _th~Y d a democrac!es ·\ 
generation. To have these powerful mdustriah~e sl jeopardtZC 
come under the sway of a hostile power would serio~ Y constantlY 
the survival of a free America, and so the U .S: as tornatic or 
nurtured the linkage with them. But there is nothing au d wor1' to 
permanent about that linkage, and unless all concer~~ d of 'CJ .S, 
sustain it, the alliance could be weakened. The wrong 10 Iude tbat 
behavior could lead the Germans, for example, to cone eroded 
their protection against the Soviet threat had become s~ 0 wiitb 
that only some approximation of Finland's accommodatt~uroPe 
the USSR really offered them protection. Since Western also toa 
and lapan are. not only U.S. allies and trading partners but ali1'e 
degree Amenca's economic competitors, they and the ~-5· cofl .. 
e?coun_ter unpalatable choices between domestic and albance 
s1derat1ons. · 
Besides these g t "di advanctt1S 
. rea powers there are some rapt Y .., 
candidates - Brazil M . · d Iran t d h ' exico, conceivably Indonesia an peS ;~t:o awdose future ~tances the current U.S. policy approac 
egree contribute 
Perhaps the key th · . . w tlle 
U.S. structures and co deme ~ntroducing difficulty mto ho 5 itl 
the 1980s is the diffu . n ucts its relationships with great powe~ 5. 
has lagged as that ot~~:'s ~ po~er. It is not so much that the. . · 115 
which the U.S. could larg ~ve industriously caught up. Dec1s10 tJt 
10 or 15 years ago must : Y s~ape ~ithin its own political syst~tb 
more domestic accommodoawt· e Widely negotiated abroad, Wl 
ton needed. 
STRENGTH AND MANNING E . 
OF THE thmerging from the Vietnam Waf, 
U.S. ARMED FORCES 1. e U.S. shifted from conscriP .. ion to vol ·ts 
armed forces. In order to do so, it red untary recruiting fort 
which volunteers would support. Whirced the services to that size 
that, for its time and milieu, the shift w::PPa~ently no one believes 
h h . a mistake the change as more t an outbved its nece . 'many now saY 
. ss1ty. Th problems about shortfall m reserve strength ere are major 
recruit quality. Reinforcing the anxiety about t~nesd, some say itt 
· e and ' fects in voluntary man~~ng are concern over the shrunk~th~r de-
the Navy the vulnerabthty of the U.S. nuclear missile f, 11 size of 
the low ~trength of the Army. Much will be heard a~rces, and 
' 980 OUt S h questions durmg the 1 s. uc 
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If the armed forces are to be strengthened, defense budgets 
must rise, perhaps substantially. Old disputes about governmental 
priorities would thus be revived, and new ones probably appear. 
Even so, the question of nonvoluntary military service may well 
prove to be the most hotly argued aspect of the issue. 1\vo alterna-
tive means are visible which could substitute for volunteer recruit-
ing. One would be a much-modified form of selective service which 
would eliminate the unfair deferments of the previous one. The 
other, which has attracted more attention, involves ··national ser-
vice," in which all young men and women would be offered choice 
arnong a variety of ways to serve the nation. Besides active mili-
tary duty and longer reserve service, there are proposals to include 
conservation work, hospital and school service, community de-
velopment programs, services to local governments, and the like. 
The rewards and terms of these would be structured with the intent 
of meeting defense needs effectively. 
~ ~~• .. 
WHAT INTERNATIONAL This issue concerns what rules 
ECONOMIC STRUCTURES? and institutional arrangements 
should apply to the transfers among nations of goods and services. 
Since World War II scores of regional and worldwide initiatives 
pave addressed the problems of economic cooperation, trade pref-
erence, foreign exchange management, and the like. Of these·, 
some have made lasting contributions, and others less. During the 
t950s and especially the 1960s, while the world's nations were 
rapidly becoming more interdependent economically, they also 
~ere experiencing more disequilibrium among the formerly stable 
mechanisms for international trade. Meanwhile the number of 
politically independent states was multiplying about fourfold. Al-
though approximately two-thirds of these new nations possessed 
1ess economic power than some U.S., Dutch, and Swiss multina-
tional corporations, many of them were trying to adjust selectively 
the rules of the game for international trade so as to favor them-
selves-often at serious cost to other countries. The oil embargo 
a,nd price rise of 1973-74 occurred, followed by inflations, reces-
sions, turmoil in managing foreign exchange, new non-tariff trade 
barriers, currency devaluations, and interruptions to economic 
growth in less-developed as well as industrialized countries. A 
flurry of international economic expedients has not yet produced 
the relatively stable predictability generally wanted, while the 
t.1ncertain dollar and Iran's convulsions have further complicated 
fllatters. 
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At this stage, then , the nations of the world feel a n urgent need 
for updated and extended structures for international economic 
activity. Since the U.S . is the strongest single economic unit , its 
proposals and its example will carry much weight. Its former 
economic dominance, however, has faded significantly, while its 
own domestic economic diffic ulties have worsened. The central 
problem is that U .S. proposals, to be effective, must satisfy both an 
international and a domestic audience. Pervadi ng the many ques-
tions the U.S. must face in dealing with this issue, writes Marina 
V. N. Whitman in an early 1979 Foreign Affairs, is one common 
theme: "the trade-off between policies that would promote the 
achievement of specific national economic or political goals, on the 
one hand, and those likely to promote the viability of a coherent 
international economic system in the long run on the other." 
WHAT ABOUT THE The ways by which the U.S . has 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES? tried to help stimulate economic 
development in less-developed countries (LDCs) are many. While 
the public tends to notice only direct U.S . aid by grants of money, 
relatively little of this is done. More assistance is given through 
multi-lateral institutions (e.g. , the World Bank) and by long-term, 
f~vorable interest rate loans. Nongovernmental development as-
sistance is encouraged, for example , by inducing a corporation to 
establish a manufacturing enterprise and to train local labor and 
managers. Educational development and transfer of suitable 
technology are emphasized. Lately the U .S. has focused its efforts 
toward the poorest countries and the poore r people in them. But 
overall the U.S. level of effort has fallen behind pas t performance 
and behind what other industrialized countries are doing. The 
Congress also has slowed and complicated the administering of aid 
by legislat ing over a hundred provisos which projects must meet. 
For development assistance to LDCs, there is not much of a 
constituency domesticall y, especially where low labor costs lead to 
underselling U.S. domestic producers . 
By s uccessfully urging decolonization a nd by pioneering in aid 
t? the LDCs, the U.S . had done much to raise the levels of expecta-
tion in the LDCs. Much good will toward America persists there 
(more than many Americans rea lize) and during a generation of 
effort , the U.S. has learned muc h about what does not work and 
some about what does. Will the U.S. now, just when awareness of 
the development gap is becoming an unsettling factor, continue to 
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taper off, or will it decide that long-run U.S. interests require doing 
more? Recent evidence suggests that public and political interest in 
such a question may have bottomed out and begun to rise. 
RECONSTRUCTING OUR A series of press exposes, Congres-
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE sional inquiries, and security vio-
CAPABILITY lations during the early and middle 
1970s brought the U.S. Intelligence community, especially the 
CIA, into public disrepute. It was clear that in at least a few 
instances some CIA employees had used methods and undertaken 
tasks of which the American people did not approve. As the press 
and the Congress avidly pursued allegations of such behavior, great 
quantities of material that had been highly secret were openly 
published. The people revealing it were not punished, and a few 
were acclaimed by some Americans as heroes. The effectiveness 
of the U.S. foreign intelligence community suffered severely, not 
least because many valuable sources stopped being sources. lest 
they too suffer damage and danger by being explicitly named in the 
American press. Other handicaps to U.S. intelligence accumulated 
rapidly: restrictions imposed by the White House and Congress. 
requirements to clear secret operations with eight different con-
gressional committees, plummeting morale, and then the loss of 
territorial access to a number of key intelligence collection sites. In 
1978 and 1979, controversy about the CIA Director and his removal 
of intelligence professionals was frequent. In the SAIT II debate. 
confidence that the U.S. intelligence apparatus could verify its 
provisions was far from universal. 
The imperatives of an open and democratic society are not 
readily reconciled with secret intelligence activity. The idea that 
the national budget, an open and public document, somehow de-
ceptively conceals substantial sums of money for intelligence 
makes some people uneasy, for example. In the present climate of 
general distrust for authority. some Americans are apprehensive 
about any secret operations within government. Given the tra-
ditional attitudes toward personal freedom. one particular fear is 
that the CIA might come to exercise some police powers. perhaps 
selectively. There is even some residue of the notion Henry Stim-
son expressed when. as Secretary of State in the 1920s. he 
abolished a fruitful code-breaking operation. saying ... Gentlemen 
do not read each other's mail.·· 
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At issue in 1979 and 1980 was the charter for U.S. intelligence 
- the various authorities and restrictions which would apply. As 
deliberations progressed, some congressional anxiety about the 
harm already done to U.S. intelligence results was visible. In that 
same light, the question of criminal penalties for revealing official 
secrets was being considered. Some intelligence experts believed 
that in the best of circumstances it would take five to ten years to 
rebuild a fully effective foreign intelligence capability. During that 
period a number of other events and policy questions are bound to 
appear which will permit contributions, for better or worse, by 
press and public, by president and Congress. 
DEMONSTRATING When Soviet nuclear strength 
NATIONAL WILL mounted in the 1950s so that deter-
AND DETERMINATION rence was no longer one-way but, in-
stead, mutual, the concept of credibility became prominent in 
national security discussions. The notion was that mere possession 
of strength was not by itself enough to influence an opponent, for 
one's willingness to use that strength had to be believable to the 
opponent. Thus, in 1961, after Khrushchev had bullied President 
Kennedy about Soviet insistence on controlling all of Berlin, the 
president called some reserve troops to active duty and sent signif-
icant army reinforcements to Europe-to validate the U.S. threat 
to fight if necessary to keep West Berlin free. His action was visibly 
supported by the Congress and the public; the Soviets could 
scarcely disbelieve U.S. determination, and deterrence thus suc-
ceeded without gunfire. The showing of U.S. will had effect not 
only on the Soviets, however, but also crucially on America's 
allies, whose stanchness, thus reinforced, further lessened the risk 
of either armed conflict or damage to the common interest. 
The pertinence of this is that a subterranean question exists-
that of how the allies and the potential opponents of America may , 
interpret its national will. Differences of judgment about that will 
create controversy about national security policies. Three or pos-
sibly four major points seem to apply. First, the Soviet arsenal, 
having steadily grown at a rate faster than America's, is now 
judged somewhere in the range of equivalence or slight superiority, 
depending on who counts what. Second, the Vietnam outcome in 
the 1970s made a vivid impression abroad whose full meaning 
Americans may not altogether grasp. At least some European 
leaders interpret the U.S. withdrawal as a clear sign that the U.S. 
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lacked national determination, and they are uneasy about what 
degree of determination underlies U.S. commitment to the com-
mon defense in NATO. How the Soviet leaders interpret it is a 
mystery, but a rather important one. Third, to a number of admit-
tedly low-order military actions during the years since, the U.S. 
has made essentially no response despite some clear harm to U.S. 
national interests and some Soviet and occasionally Cuban in-
volvement. These of course are the events in Angola, Zaire, 
Ethiopia, Somalia, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Iran. Both America's 
opponents and its allies, not only those in Europe, know well that 
the U.S. possessed some capability to influence those events but 
abstained from using it. Voices are sometimes heard abroad at-
tributing this, also, to a lack of U.S. will, and one wonders about 
the voices which are silent. The fourth point, a tentative one, is that 
leaders abroad might perceive Americans as doing little to reduce 
oil consumption or otherwise deal effectively with an already eco-
nomically damaging energy problem, and might interpret this too 
as confirming their forebodings about national will in the United 
States. 
Many Americans, of course, will judge such thoughts unreal 
or not relevant. The U.S. should never be the world's policeman, 
they hold, and it withdrew from Vietnam simply to correct a grave 
national error. What the U.S. can do is limited, after all, and is best 
done mostly at home, in trying to perfect a society and economy 
where equal justice, and equal opportunity for self-fulfillment are 
accessible to all. Nor should this be read, they would continue, as 
introducing any doubt at all about U.S. willingness, even determi-
nation, to defend its own freedom and the freedom of its allies. Of 
course the U.S. will defend them; the question is simply of the best 
manner of doing so. 
Indeed. Precisely in this area of choosing the best national 
security policies will other Americans urge that the matter of 
national determination is a major criterion. The forces the nation 
maintains and what it does with them, they will insist, should be 
consciously chosen so as to resolve doubts abroad about U.S. 
determination, the better to deter conflict. If debate on this issue 
should occur only during short-run crisis, then the risk of danger-
ous error would rise. 
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dllce tbe 
now to re tbe tel\ 
HOW CAN THE U.S. What can the U.S. do war? f{ave ·tb tbe 
REDUCE THE RISKS possibility of nuclear tiations w;0rtber
1 
OF NUCLEAR WAR? years of SALT nego otiatio0.5• ie1 ~ 
Soviets helped'? Should the U.S. pursue such ~e: to negoue.t1lefica· 
Should it build a stronger foundation f~o~ whtc d should /it:5~1 
the Soviets pushing for nuclear supenontY, a!1 ucleaf fl \Jc\e~ 
What may be the costs, both in money and in. n ce witb tle\ol'e 
As to the Russians, out of mutual expeneo. have de" t\1/een 
pressures some sophisticated prudence see~s to rtions 1,e y (but 
on both sides. A hotline exists. The gross d1sproP
0 
t11lltt.19:11 idess 
political objectives and nuclear devastation are noW tbe \lfll~s of 
no doubt somewhat differently) recognized, as are.00s ye still, 
uncertainties about escalation. During 30 contentl 0 se0· S· be 
mutual nuclear capability, no nuclear weapon has been be tJ · 
with the Soviets at nuclear parity or beyond, can t 0,s il'l 
confident that their abstention will continue'? 111e8-P
0 
tiotl5 
Perhaps a na~tier problem may be that of nuclear tie! fle. ~d 
hands less expenenced with nuclear threats. Four ot cllifle.' ~ie., 
hav~ already tested nuclear weapons: Britain, France, ;.ost! ede. 
India. Many others could· Japan Germany Israel, ,...,-1\.llt' o""' 
South Afric d . ' ' · tS e."""' j 
\ 
a, an so on. What if Arab or other terrons arilY tt,...ct 
nuc ear weapon? Will d 5Sv eJ>v 
em the handlin . of su~ru ence and humaneness nee: \'Jl'l~t. t 11U" 
would their useg h h we~pons by all these others . 5ov1e 1ess 
ave upon mere · . f Tl S.. 0o i 
clear exchange? Does all th· asmg the nsk o u · · old (Jlbe.t 
toward dampe~ing conmc/:~:ggest. that the U.S. sbO ore'? 1ee."e 
freedom of action must the peo l tensions abroad, or fll efore 
to the Executive: P e and the Congress tbel' seri"' 
These questions affecting th ~dlY 0cb 
ous. They must be continuously :;:clear hazard are defroffl s 011 .. 
distorting pressures as factional po::ssed, in isolatio~ defll e,t 
strators, and lobbyists. The surviv~ics, placard-wa"'1trectlY 
stake. of the nation is • 
CRIMIN AL JUSTICE 
h · l · t t t .. ... the From t e s1mp e m en o establish . . i.ic•• d 
· · Justice" w•• ·ve 1 
Preamble to the Const1tut1on expresses~ many den t 
· · l · · 1 systems ... ,os and that for cnmma Justice was on Y. one among tberO· l"" tbe 
Americans were affected far more often, 1fless dramaticallY, bY 
civil law system. Within the structure of American justice were 
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such spe . C1aJ· 
corporat· •zed elements as tax law admiralty Jaw, probate law, 
•on I d . . ' aJ levels of fe aw, an m1htary law. There were sever types and 
lower le deral courts and a great variety of courts at state and 
thousandVeJs. Under the broad umbreJJa of administrative law, 
seemed ts of quasi-judicial tribunals existed whose functions 
In a(~ blend imperceptibly from regulation to enforcement. 
governed these elements, America has sought to have its affairs 
The_ideaJ ~ laws rather. than by the unguided discretion '!f men. 
atta1nabi/ ~l of equal fairness for every citizen was not ulttmat~ly 
outcorn ' smce laws were not self-executing and few reaJ-bfe 
were to ~:;ver satisfied all parties equally. Yet, if all Americans 
essential e shared confidence in how they were governed, it was 
Bee to pursue that goal unceasingly. 
tice systause the pursuit went on amid incessant change, the jus-
erns h d · stances 8 a to adapt continuously to contemporary c1rcum-to resp~ 0 th the laws and the mechanisms for applying them had 
and eve::id to technology, social development, population s~ifts, 
deeply ro~· At_ the same time, however, these syst~ms remamed 
Carta and tted 10 old English principles, deriving _via the Mag?a 
ness and he common law, which create expectations about fair-
state. i\ a_bout how the citizen relates to a far from omnipotent 
and elab ncient standards of justice have been greatly reenforced 
Constitu~·rated by the bill of rights and the 14th Amendment to the 
Roland 1/
0
n of the United States as interpreted by the Courts. 
this Proc gger has called the contlibutions of the Warren Court to 
can hist ess one of the five authentic social revolutions in Ameri-
Mosher Ory. (You will read his essay in the volume edited by 
' A.,n . . ture assi e~ican Publ,c Administration: Past,. Present and Fu-
gned m Sequence 9.) 
What wa . II . . . . h legislat. s especia y important for public adm1mstrators mt e 
upon •ve and judicial elaboration of private rights was the effect 
how Agove_rnment, and it was great. The justice system affected 
upon . rn~r~cans were governed and by whom. It had crucial impact 
whet~:d•~•d~al faith in government. People judged for themselves 
we~ hr Justice applied impartially to each. whether all people 
numeb eld equally accountable for conforming to the law. If large 
the 
8 
ers Were to lack confidence that, allowing for human error. 
ti /stem treated them fairly, would government be able to func-
on. 
btttention is here focused upon criminal justice not because 
pro ems were lacking elsewhere in American justice. In fact. 
J 
there were many. Americans were a very litigious people_. Som: 
said that there were far too many laws and lawyers. Certainly th,:',, 
'50s, '60s and '70s witnessed a surge of legal action on behalf o~: 
many who had previously not found access to it. Who would doubt,; 
that on balance this surge had yielded more good than bad, if oolY1; 
because of the social and economic injustices it had so far set rigb~?1 i 
- .I But the civil dockets in most courts were extremely long, and othe_M 
problems abounded as well. 
, I 
Nevertheless, the fear of violent crime was the leading coi\f i 
cern of the American people from the mid-1960's to the late 1970'~; i 
and even in 1980 only such vital matters as inflation and uneire · 
ployment were above it on poll af~er poll. _Because the AmericaQ:; 
people were so alarmed_ ab~~t crime, their .~olitic~l leaders hadi1 
responded, and terms hke law_ ~nd o_rder and 'crime in the.1, 
streets" appeared regularly in poht1c_al discourse. There Was Iegi~f 
lation at state and federal lev~ls, with by far the most importanfil, 
being the federal government s Safe Streets Act of 1968 ~i~ 
d I h d d h , seve~ ,, times thereafter amende . t a create t e Law EnforcemeJitil 
Assistance Administration (LEAA) and had begun the practice dfi1 
furnishing ~ederal money to states for anti-crime activity. Th( 
oft-reorgamzed LEAA was to be restructured again in 1980 but tfie_· 1 
federal government's concern with "crime" continued. ' 1 
The 1968 reform effort was not the first address to the criminal!' 
justice problem, any more than it will be the last. Three presidenti~I: 
commissions made major national studies and recommended re-
forms. These were the Wickersham Commission in 1931 (National! 
Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement), the Katze11· 
bach Commission in 1967 (President's Commission on Law Bit 
forcement and the Administration of Justice), and the Peterson 
Commission in 1973 (National Advisory Commission on Criminal 
Justice Standards and Goals). The last of these was oriented 
toward specific remedial action; it developed standards and goals 
for states and localities to consider. The states thereupon made 
major efforts to develop their standards and goals, and much 
reform activity has been and will be derived from these. It is 
reasonable to expect at least one more nationwide evaluation dur· · 
I ing the 1980s. 1 
But the LEAA program was not only the first nationally 
funded major effort against crime but was also the envelope within 
which activity at all levels of government proceeded. The states of 
course have primary responsibility for criminal justice, and nearly 
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all the activity is carried out either at state or local levels; very little 
is federal. Similarly, very little of the expenditure within a state on 
criminal justice-about 3 to 5 percent during the late 1970s-was 
federal money. Yet that federal money was highly significant, since 
it was money available for innovation. The great bulk of state and 
local funding necessarily went toward such relatively fixed costs as 
police pay and court and prison operation. Moreover, the LEAA 
created a criminal justice infrastructure which got research done, 
stimulated dissemination of knowledge, and encouraged mutual 
cooperation within the system. 
During its brief existence, LEAA had attracted much crit-
icism. Because it was national and visible, when crime did not 
vanish despite LEAA's work, some people accused it of having 
failed. More realistically, there indeed were some vulnerabilities, 
such as massive, fitfully changing regulations and guidelines. Con-
gress had legislated minutely what LEAA must administer, and no 
President had yet lent it the weight of his active support. In any 
case, however well or poorly LEAA had functioned as an agency, it 
would have been grossly unfair to blame it for not stamping out 
crime. The domestic police power is exercised at municipal and 
county levels. The criminal laws are nearly all state laws, and the 
courts which try violations are established by the states. The jails 
are generally county, and the prisons are state institutions. The 
leverage the federal agency could have with all these was really 
rather limited. Underneath all of these efforts there are some basic 
intractabilities about crime and such elemental ignorance of the 
causes of crime that the slow progress in reducing crime must be 
recognized as inevitable. 
Nevertheless, it is to the LEAA program that perhaps the 
most significant advance in criminal justice must be credited. In 
1968, few people appreciated that the police, the courts, and cor-
rections, plus some others, were so interdependent as to really 
constitute a single criminal justice system. Since then, however, 
the legislation, the money, and the way LEAA operated brought a 
high percentage of criminal justice leaders in each state to a recog-
nition of how their responsibilities and activities interacted with 
and affected those of other such leaders. LEAA programs had 
brought people together, induced them to communicate, and stimu-
lated degrees of coordination unknown a decade ago but highly 
beneficial to the public interest. 
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These autonomous criminal justice leaders had come under 
intense pressures created by overloads - the soaring crime rate 
was the source of everyone's difficulty- and because their own 
resources were so strained, no one gave thought to helping others 
in the criminal justice field. Then LEAA gathered groups together 
so that police chiefs could see prosecutors' problems, and judges 
could grasp wardens' problems, and so on, while officials at state 
levels could better understand the needs and capabilities at local 
levels, and vice versa. A way was provided for the system to draw 
closer together in some sort of cooperative coordination. Each 
leader presently saw ways he could be helped by and could help 
others, gaining a large return from a modest investment. Slowly-
and with a long way yet to go - the system began to work as a 
system. 
LEAA's achievement was through state and substate 1 1•0g . . . . . pann 
act1v1ty. The 1968 law required, as pr~cond1t1on for federal funds, 
that each state create a State Planmng Agency (SPA) u d r the 
· · b d h n e governor. As its governmg oar , t e SPA was to have a council 
with people from all levels of government and all components in 
criminal justice. Every state promptly did so, and began doing 
some approximation of the "comprehensive planning" required. 
While the full-time planners were struggling with that part, the 
people on the council (and corresponding groups at substate levels) 
were learning in detail about other criminal justice activities be-
sides their own. They were creating networks of communication, 
establishing broader-based support, and edging steadily toward , 
appreciation of the system-wide view-with its need for priorities, 
for coordination, for analysis of alternatives. 
Each state, of course, followed its own path, and their indi-
vidual experiences and results were therefore unique. Some-such 
as Virginia, California, and Michigan-progressed far toward real 
coordination, even though the autonomy of, for example, tocal 
sheriffs and county courts, which is so fundamental to our gov-
ernmental system, also made coordination hard to achieve. some 
states are in earlier stages but progressing in worthwhile directions. 
The distinctive personalities of each state ensured distinctiveness 
also in the modes of, say, doing coordinated planning for long-term 
needs for corrections facilities. Even so, in every state, more 
coordination was seen in the criminaljustice picture than there was 
formerly. This is beneficial and promising, and it has been stimu-
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lated by federal leadership and nourished through the LEAA pro-
grams. 
Some critics say that of the two chief objectives of criminal 
justice reform, crime reduction and system improvement, the 
LEAA program had achieved results only in system improvement, 
whereas crime reduction is the one which the public wanted and 
needed. Other observers hold that whether or not some reduction 
occurred, improving the system was itself worthy, not least be-
cause it increased the respect for law, yielded better treatment of 
victims and witnesses, and made more effective and economical 
use of public funds. The fact remained that crime rates continued 
to rise. 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROBLEMS 
Having noted that reform is under way, some of the existing 
problems will be considered. The list below is only representative 
and is by no means offered as complete or necessarily comprising 
the most urgent problems. 
DIFFUSION In the United States, responsibility for 
OF RESPONSIBILITY criminal justice is bewilderingly dif-
fuse. The states possess most responsibility in the first instance, 
and have transmitted varying shares of power to lower levels. In 
general, most police power is at city level, prosecutors generally 
function at county level, courts are mostly county and state, jails 
are county or sometimes city, and prisons are state-operated. But 
the exceptions and special cases are many, and as demographic and 
socioeconomic changes occur,jurisdictions are sometimes shifted. 
There are more than 40,000 public agencies in the criminal justice 
··system", and the bulk of them are essentially autonomous. Many 
of the leaders are themselves elected officials - sheriffs, district 
attorneys, many judges, most state attorneys general- and feel 
responsive to the people, not to the county commission or the 
governor. Most others report to elected local officials, whose au-
tonomy is well known. Judicial independence is central to the 
American democratic system. Most Americans, for that matter, 
seem to feel that local control of police is also. These separations of 
powers bolster the peoples' liberties, but they also fragment the 
responsibility for domestic security and make integrated function-
ing extremely hard to achieve. 
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MANPOWER Throughout the criminal justice system, one 
DIFFICULTIES sees some splendid people, but also some seri-
ous inadequacies in manpower quality, quantity, training, and 
sometimes motivation. During the first decade of reform, federal 
and state programs have aimed to rectify these by such im-
provements as better selection, pay raises, and especially training 
and education. The police area shows remarkable improvement in 
some localities and probably at least some improvement 
everywhere. Of course, the police, being highly visible, disci-
plined, and sustained by group cohesion, ought to respond to 
directed change. But the police officer tends toward the status quo, 
experiences daily the diversity of real life, and hence skeptically 
views the untried theory. So reform is incomplete, and still meets 
obstacles. 
In the courts, one sees wide variations in skill and attitude. 
Invoking judicial independence, some judges (mainly at county 
levels) resist such management improvements as the use of court 
administrators and standardized data handling. Many trial law-
yers, according to the U.S. chi~f justice and others, are not fully 
competent at courtroom techmques, and so a wave of remedial 
training is under way. 
The jails and prisons show the widest gap between the desira-
ble personnel situation and the actual. Low pay, low status, and an 
atmosphere often of dehumanized degradation do not naturally 
attract uniformly splendid recruits. Until recently, corrections 
people often felt unsupported, had low states of training, and were 
given skimpy budgets, but improvement in these areas is generally 
underway. The cultural gap is a special difficulty, however, with 
many inmates, but too few correctional officers, being urban 
minority members. 
The potential benefits from achieving in courts and correc-
tions a degree of manpower improvement comparable to that in the 
police area seem to be many. These two areas have longer contact 
with offenders and more opportunity to shift offenders away from 
crime. Moreover, many of the new or improved programs in both 
will require ad~iti?nal peo~le o~ greater potential with better train-
. At this pomt it seems mev1table that some new programs will 
mg. fail and be discarded, not because they lack merit, but simply 
because they were not manned suitably. 
31 
-
> 
~~:==~·c,c~~~~ - -i 
POLICE When criminal justice reform began, both th~ 
IMPROVEMENT perceived difficulties and the visible opportt1!31- 1 
ties were in the police area. The thought was that since police 
handle crime, an increase in crime called for reinforcing the police· 
Moreover, the rationally organized police forces could react ' 
promptly when provided new resources and could begin the itn-
provement process without delay. In the early years, consequentlY, 
police got strong priority from federal, state, and local go'V-
emments. As experience and understanding accumulated, how-
ever, it became clear both that courts and corrections needed much 
more attention, and that a system-wide view should govern 
priorities. Of great significance is the fact that at LEAA's Mid-1979 
Conference* for senior criminaljustice leadership of all states, the 
police were scarcely mentioned, and all sessions were devoted to 
other areas. 
Actually, many problems remain in the police area, but much 
experimentation and analysis are also under way. Few of the 
thousands of small police forces (under ten officers) have been 
consolidated, but some common-servicing occurs. Although 
minority representation on police forces is generally insufficient, 
many forces sustain strong minority-recruiting efforts and inch 
ahead. Community relations remains a troubled area, but many 
cities are progressing well. lraining programs, certification stan-
dards, and communications capabilities are generally much better. 
Techniques for such activities as patrol, crisis intervention, and 
evidence handling have been the subjects of much experimentati_on 
and development. Results are widely disseminated, so that pobce 
organizations can more easily stay abreast of the state of the art-
COURT Each state has created, over the years, its own 
IMPROVEMENT distinctive system(s) of courts. All are separate 
and independent from the rest of government, except that the 
money comes from legislative bodies, and such basic conditions as 
structure, size, pay scales, and tenure are fixed by legislative and 
executive action. Hence, the judiciary can recommend but not 
decide whether, for example, all courts should be state courts or 
Whether some should be county and city ones. The recent trend has 
~een toward consolidating courts into one state system, but some-
times the central management is loosely applied. 
•see previous footnote. 
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A stronger trend is the introduction of "court administrators" 
to relieve judges of managerial duties. Although often resisted 
initially, especially at county levels, these administrators usually 
come to be viewed as great assets. 
Courts have not yet achieved, in most instances, records and 
data systems which are rational, uniform, and usable by the crimi-
nal justice system as a whole. Judges vary in willingness to adapt, 
and some assert that data management threatens judicial inde-
pendence. The variety of data systems remains troublesomely 
great. 
Dockets are still crowded almost everywhere. While many 
states have reduced delays to the point that cases come to trial 
routinely within sixty days, in some others trials are not promptly 
held. Plea bargaining remains usual, occurring in from 65 to 85 
percent of felony cases. 
Judges sentence convicted offenders, but do so in conformity 
with laws which govern sentencing. A major trend is under way in 
many states, usually led by legislators rather thanjudges, changing 
these laws away from indeterminate to determinate terms. Lying 
behind this is not only a growing attitude of "lock'-em'up-and-
throw-away-the-key," but also the virtual abandonment of the 
belief that prisons can rehabilitate inmates. The indeterminate 
sentencing concept was linked with the rehabilitation concept. The 
idea was that the judge would set the minimum and maximum 
terms far apart, which let the warden and the parole board key the 
inmate's release to his progress in the rehabilitation process. 
Lately, however, many legislatures have begun enacting more spe-
cific penalties; a statute might set, for example, three to five years 
as the penalty for an offense formerly punishable by one year to 
life. Many judges are sensitive about having their discretion thus 
constricted, and some evasive maneuvering by them is predicta-
ble. 
CORRECTIONS Such a shift to determinate sentencing will have 
IMPROVEMENT definite impact on prison population numbers, 
even though legislators do not customarily check with corrections 
officials before voting. The shift is one reflection of new emphasis 
upon the concept that the purpose of corrections should be simply 
punishment, or perhaps punishment plus protection of the public. 
(A fourth possible purpose of corrections-besides rehabilitation, 
punishment, and protecting the public - is deterrence, but its 
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CRIMINAL JUSTICE ISSUES 
. h but effec-
None of the above problems seem likely to ~ants ' matters. 
tive attack on issues such as those below could improve 
nage a sus-
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The most s · · cort'e · n 
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commissions as well as the legislature competing with the governor 
for control over state prisons and state police. 
The nation reacted to increased crime by creating a federal 
agency, LEAA, and equipping it not only with research and dis-
semination services but primarily with federal funds to grant to 
states. Federal legislation induced each state to have an SPA which 
LEAA encourages to take a system-wide view and which allocates 
most LEAA money within the state. Federal leverage has brought 
together, in state-level councils and substate boards, senior repre-
sentatives of all the criminal justice components and all levels of 
government. They log-roll a great deal, but many of them also 
come gradually, to a broader comprehension of the overall criminal 
justice system of which their individual activities are a part. Thus 
they, as well as the SPA planners, can better perceive priority needs 
and deficiencies in the system. 
One great shortcoming of all this is that the overwhelming bulk 
of criminal justice activity is funded by state and local legislative 
bodies, which are not automatically engaged in that process. Some 
states have drawn the legislature into close and fruitful contact 
with the process, but most have not. Some states have caused the 
SPA to overwatch ( owing to the separation of powers, it cannot 
control) all criminal justice activity in the state, but others focus 
the SPA's attention on merely the federally funded portion. 
Efforts are periodically made to eliminate or shrink LEAA, to 
pass federal funds directly to local governments, and otherwise to 
adjust the way federal leadership is applied. 
IS VIOLENT At one point, some observers wondered if 
CRIME SUBSIDING the crime problem might not simply begin 
to fade away, carrying with it the public's willingness to support 
expensive programs far from fruition. In a notable October 1973 
Atlantic article, updated in Wilson's Thinking about Crime. James 
Q. Wilson and Robert L. DuPont had suggested that the epidemic 
increase of crime could possibly be attributed primarily to the 
post-World War II baby boom. After that population bulge passed 
through the crime-prone fifteen to twenty-four age bracket, would 
crime rates fall? By 1980, it had now passed, and the rates may have 
stuttered a time or two but generally seem still rising. Charles 
Silberman, in Criminal Violence, Criminal Justice. suggests that 
the particular circumstances of the blacks, who are both the most 
frequent offenders and most frequent victims, are especially rele-
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vant. He says, "What has happened in the last fifteen years, in 
good measure, is that the cultural devices that kept black violence 
under control have broken down, and that new cultural controls 
have not yet emerged." Also to be noted is that crime rates derive 
from crime reporting, which is done more fully now than before-
except for murders, which show the same rising rates. As yet it is 
not clear whether crime rates are, one day, to decline at last,. or 
whether there are powerful tendencies which will steadily brmg 
more alienation, lawlessness, violence. 
IS WHITE COLLAR CRIME To the newspapers and TV, violent 
TOO UTILE NOTICED? crime is what seems to count. 
~any Americans are now wondering, however, if the rates of 
mcrease in white collar crime much of it undetected, may not be 
' l s greater. There have always been embezzlers, sticky-fingered s~ e 
clerks, and businesses operating outside the law. But the questi~n 
now is whether with computerization and other new intricacies, 10 
an atmosphere of changing social values, there may be far more 
e~onomic crime than is visible. Quite apart from the matter of more 
vigorous pursuit of undetected crime is that of how discovered 
~rimes are handled. Some flagrant cases ofingenious thieves en~er-
mg computer systems to steal millions or of businesses defrauding 
' fi a customers on a grand scale have led to sentences milder than or 
bank robber stealing a few ~housand dollars. This raises questions 
of equity and public confidence. 
WHAT SHOULD Discontent with corrections as now prac-
CORRECTIONS DO? ticed seems to be nearly universal. ~he 
Peterson Commission, judging confinement to be dehuma~iztn: 
and bound to obstruct the integration of a released offender mto 
productive, peaceful relationship with society, had urged a ban on 
b ·1d· · d ui mg ~ny more large prisons. Instead, it held, pro~at1on ant 
commumty-based corrections should be used extensively. B_u 
community resistance to these has been powerful, and meanwhile 
the numbers of convicted offenders still mount. Knowledge about 
the effects of corrections programs has been exc~e.dingly rudimen-
tary, and is only now beginning to approach usab1hty ~s the results 
of LEAA-sponsored research begin to appear. It re~at~s to be se.en 
how the new understanding we soon may expect wtll mteract with 
t~e shift of public and political attitudes away from the rehabilita-
tive purpose of corrections and toward the purpose of punishment 
or just desert. In practical terms, large prisons are expensive, and 
most states now have overcrowded prisons. 
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INEQUITY Ideally, the judicial process and especially its 
IN SENTENCING climax in the courtroom should communicate 
to everyone a sense of fairness, so that each individual seeing it 
may be strengthened in a belief that the system is indeed just. But 
people convicted for similar offenses often get strikingly dissimilar 
sentences. Many are deeply antagonized by what they take to be 
the capriciousness of the court. Class and racial patterns seem to 
emerge. But judges and corrections officials have long insisted that 
automatic, uniform sentences fail to accommodate the great varia-
tions in offenses and offenders and would therefore be grossly 
unjust. Moreover, new research, such as Silberman reports in 
Criminal Violence, Criminal Justice, suggests there is far more 
consistency and equitableness in sentencing than is communi-
cated. Both judicial groups and legislatures have been giving in-
tense attention to the sentencing process. Among the reforms 
considered, in addition to determinate sentencing and flat sentenc-
ing, are sentencing guidelines, sentencing institutes and councils, 
appellate reviews of sentencing, and legislated rules about the 
factors to be considered and written explanations by the judge who 
weighed them. 
DECRIMINALIZATION A number of offenses are being called vic-
timless by some observers. Drunkenness, 
use (not sale) of marijuana, gambling, and prostituion are usually 
among them. Various proposals are made periodically to decrimi-
nalize some of these offenses, one reason being to cut down the 
workload of courts and corrections and, to a lesser degree of the 
police. Some of the resistance to such proposals is on the grounds 
that to do so would be offensive to public concepts of morality. 
Then there is a question of treatment alternatives to arrest. Ulti-
mately these appear to be political questions, subject to attitudinal 
and demographic changes. 
BEH A~IOR The police are highly visible to the public. POLICE M Their activities, at least at the all-
important individual level, are the least patterned of any in the 
criminal justice system. The police officer not only enforces the 
law but keeps order. As government's representative on the spot. 
he must cope with the frictions and tragedies of every day life. 
Necessarily, he has some discretionary authority-for example. 
whether to arrest or to warn. Often under pressure, he must decide 
swiftly, seldom with full information. 
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Yet the way the police officer decides, acts, and speaks will 
reflect, particularly for people in lower socioeconomic strata, the 
presence and the capability for service or for repression of all levels 
of government. To perhaps most Americans, the police officer is 
government, for it is he whom they see, he who obliges their 
conformance to the law. His manner, therefore, has much potential 
influence on the attitudes people have toward government. 
Whether a citizen regards it as his government or theirs is affected 
by police behavior. 
There is wide diversity in how various Americans regard the 
local police. The stereotype is of the well-off suburban whites, who 
see the police officer as a helpful friend, by contrast with the 
poverty-level urban blacks, who see him as a hostile bully, even 
enemy. As the readings suggest, the actuality is far more compli-
cated. But many localities do sometimes have tense relationships 
between police and minority groups. Efforts to improve mutual 
understanding are frequent and of mixed success. The same seems 
true of the identification and correction of racist practices within 
some police forces. Reform is under way but incomplete. And it 
seems vitally important. 
SECURITY AS THE FOUNDATION OF 
GOVERNMENT 
Laws are not self-enforcing. Perhaps in most modern 
societies, most people will ordinarily obey most laws simply be-
cause they feel it right to do so. But for extraordinary circum-
stances and for the less scrupulous, in order to achieve consistent 
obedience, some motivation must be supplied. Hence, gov-
ernments use some system of reward and punishment, but the 
recent as well as the historical experience of mankind assure us 
that still more is needed. A government, in order to protect its own 
people from each other, must therefore apply coercive force. It 
may be sad, but it is so. 
In America, we see this coercive force as the criminal justice 
system with police officers as the visible manifestation. 
Any experienced police leader, however, will attest that police 
resources at best can deal with only modest quantities of disorder 
beyond the day-to-day routine. When a greater disturbance occurs 
-a flood, a tornado, a significant riot-local police are too few and 
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must get help. Reinforcements from nearby police, sheriff's de-
partments, and state police can extend their capability only mod-
estly and briefly. Hence, in such situations, the state governor will 
often call upon his military force, the army National Guard. While 
most people perceive the National Guard as a federal force, they 
really are not federal except in very unusual circumstances, such 
as declared wars. What they are is state militia, ordinary citizens 
with regular jobs who are also part-time so1diers, ready to become 
full time at the governor's command. 
When a governor calls some or all of his state militia to active 
duty to cope with a flood or riot, they are used in aid of the civil 
authority; martial law and other supercessions of the civil au-
thority are very seldom needed. Such is the American military 
ethos that these soldiers (and the regulars too) take special pride in 
the rapidity with which they can show the civil authority a situation 
of restored order and can fade from the scene. 
Two things here are unique to America. One is that the military 
have never undertaken to usurp political control. Civil control of 
the military is an enduring fact, and military control of the govern-
ment is simply not a possibility, let alone a threat. Elsewhere in the 
world it happens, but not here. The second unique feature is that 
the principal military foundation of civil government is militia-
controlled below the national government level. Elsewhere, the 
rescue of civil authority in storm or riot is by the national gov-
ernment's troops. 
In 1967-68 many American cities experienced civil distur-
bances so large and violent that National Guard and active army 
troops had to be used to restore order. Perhaps all such mass 
disorder may be behind us, but it is possible that the worst is yet to 
come. There may be some unpredictable combination of energy 
restrictions, economic distress, urban discontent, political ter-
rorism, mistrust of authority, feverish self-interest, and other fac-
tors which could push large numbers of Americans above the riot 
flashpoint. In some particular circumstances, adversity could also 
cause Americans to unite, but it is sobering to recall public behav-
ior in the 1979 gasoline lines. 
If the U.S. should face new levels of civil turmoil, which is not 
inconceivable during the 1980s and 1990s, not only the security 
forces but even government itself would be sorely stressed. For if 
civil government, using its police resources and aid from the mili-
tary, cannot swiftly restore order, anarchy results. The strongest 
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and the cruelest then would exert power over others , without 
accountability. As history shows, populations will not long tolerate 
such anarchy but will sooner cede their freedoms to new, more 
repressive government. 
If U.S. national security prospects were altogether bright, 
large scale domestic disorder would be less likely. But economic 
interdependence generally and U .S. dependence on foreign oil 
more particularly have expanded America's vulnerability. Mean-
while the Soviet Union has been investing heavily in military 
power and the capability to project it. Some strategists are worried 
that the USSR, either despite or perhaps because of a generational 
change in leadership and serious domestic problems , might try 
dangerously to exploit that strength. The threat these strategists 
perceive is not direct attack but Soviet political action which use_s 
military power as its fulcrum and aims at seriously harming Ame_n-
~an al~ies or the alliance relationship itself. Even if armed co~~ict 
1s avoided, these strategists say, the economic as well as pohticaJ 
consequences for t_he U.S. would be painful. If they are sufficiently 
so, ~hese economic consequences could cause domestic effects 
leading to civil disorder possibly to r . 
"TI , epress1on. 
o _as~ure the continuation of American freedoms, therefore, 
t~e nation s first priority concern must be effective security, pro-
tded through the criminal justice system the national armed 
orces, and the National Guard, which link~ them. 
The prospects for America's future need not be as ominous as 
these last paragraphs suggest. The nation has successfully faced 
g:eat threats before. It is resilient and in th h been respon-
sive to national leadershi Be ' e past, as . is not 
weakness but great pot~~tiat:~r::~~~ u?/e~lyi~g sit~a:~o;eople 
coalesce they can develop and use th ' I t e menc remain 
secure and free . But this is at strength calmly, to ·res 
. no automat" It requ1 
conscious policies pursued with d t . 1~ process . tional 
self-discipline. The nature of the erm1nat1on and some na . ely 
ese p (" . . . t nsJV 
debated during the early 1980s. 0 1c1es will be m e 
Commentary Assignment 
[The standard assignment for Sequ I ase 
note that it is subject to change by th ence 2-1 follows. p e ·r 
a e preceptor who may mod• Y, 
mend, or revise it. In that event you will . ' ·gn-
m h . receive the new ass• 
ent t rough the Cluster director.] 
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Each Nova participant is expected to submit in advance of 
seminar discussion a 10- 15-page commentary dealing with three of 
the following four topics: 
l. Explain broadly the kind of system you believe should be 
used to bring people into the U.S. armed forces, and the 
reasons why you prefer that system. 
2. Discuss the consequences and implications of Congress' 
increased assertiveness in the national security field during 
the 1970s. 
3. Discuss the criminaljustice issue you believe deserves first 
priority attention in your community or state, explaining 
why it does. 
4. Discuss some advantages and disadvantages of 
community-based corrections, compared with incarcerat-
ing off enders in large remote institutions. 
Required Reading 
Brown, Seyom, An End to Grand Strategy, Foreign Policy. 
Fall 1978, pp. 22-46. 
Bundy, William P., Elements of Power, Foreign Affairs. Oc-
tober 1977, pp. 1-26. 
Ellsworth, Robert F., and ADELMAN, Kenneth L., Foolish 
Intelligence, Foreign Policy. Fall 1979, pp. 147-159. 
Graham, Thomas R., Revolution in 'Irade Politics, Foreign 
Policy. Fall 1979, pp. 49-63. 
Harris, Richard, Crime in New York, New Yorker, September 
26, 1977, pp. 56 et seq. 
Hyland, William G., Brezhnev and Beyond, Foreign Affairs. 
Fall 1979, pp. 51-66. 
Lynn, Laurence E. Jr., Designing Public Policy: A Casebook 
on The Role of Policy Analysis, Santa Monica, CA., Goodyear 
Publishing Co., 1980. Chapters 1-2, 19-21. 
Owen, Henry and Schultze, Charles (eds.), Setting National 
Priorities: The Next Ten Years, Washington, Brookings, 1976. 
Chapters 1-6. 
Pechman, Joseph A., Setting National Priorities: Agenda for 
the 1980s, Washington Brookings, 1980. Chapters l, 3, 9-15. 
Ukles, Jacob B., Policy Analysis: Myth or Reality, P.A.R., 
May/June 1977, pp. 223-228. 
Wilson, James Q., Thinking about Crime, (NY: Random 
House, 1975). 
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Supplementary Reading 
For further reading in the national security field, one can find 
abundant material in the average public library; even small col-
leges are likely to have reasonable collections of specialized mate-
rial. The preeminent periodical is Foreign Affairs, published quar-
terly by the Council on Foreign Relations. Virtually every public 
library has it. Besides containing much authoritative or scholarly 
coverage of current and future problems, it also includes biblio-
graphical assessments of the more significant recent books in the 
international field. In recent years it has paid close attention to 
international economic matters, but aside from questions of nu-
clear deterrence it devotes relatively little attention to strategic and 
defense policy matters. To these topics the quarterly Foreign Pol-
icy does give more space. It is also deliberately sprightlier, more 
open to the untested idea and to the younger writer. During its first 
decade it has already earned high standing by the quality of its 
often provocative treatments. But military policy matters have 
more recently come to be covered with greater thoroughness, 
although in somewhat more academic fashion, by the quarterly 
International Security. In addition, there are dozens of specialized 
periodicals, some oriented toward practitioners and others toward 
scholars. Most have carved out a particular segment of the field to 
deal with, as their titles usually indicate: Middle East Journal, 
Army, Asian Survey, Air University Quarterly Review. 
Books of high quality published each year in the national 
security field number several hundred in English alone. Besides 
the short descriptions of most of them in Foreign Affairs. brief 
reviews of a lesser number can be found in the bimonthly Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science. As a 
national review, the Wilson Quarterly undertakes broad coverage, 
always includes some national security material. Besides offering 
some highly discriminating book selections, it also routinely di-
gests a number of articles from a wide range of sources. 
Most journalism in the national security field is decidedly 
undistinguished, usually playing up the sensational and applying a 
snapshot approach. Curiously enough, the weekly New Yorker 
occasionalJy has highly perceptive articles with admirable 
perspective, but it does not pretend to more than intermittent 
coverage. Much the soundest journalistic coverage appears in the 
British Economist which, despite its name, is a newsweekly but 
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.i 
one Written with comprehension, and an appreciation of i·nt 
. erac-
tions, which its U.S. counterparts have not yet achieved. 
. The criminal justice literature is far less developed and is al 
highly uneven in quality and coverage. Only for a decade have so 
. . I b any 
significant numbers of skilled peop e een researching and wn·t· 
. f . . mg 1n this field. Moreover, the concept o cnmmal justice as one 
system is relatively new; the tendency I?ersists for practitioners to 
see themselves only as part of corrections, or courts, or law en-
forcement. As yet no periodicals have approached the stature of a 
Foreign Policy. let alone Foreign Affairs. But many periodicals do 
cover aspects of criminal justic~. Amon~ them are the Journal of 
Criminal Justice, Law and Society Review, the Police Chief. the 
American Journal of Corrections, and a number of university law 
reviews. But the coverage of issue~, as distinct from technical 
questions, is perhaps broader, if ~o.re scattered, in the 
nonspecialized literature; dozens of penodicals-Pub/ic Interest, 
Harper's, and the New York Times Magazine, for example-from 
time to time publish articles in the field. Ebony devoted its entire 
August 1979 issue to the problem of crime in the black community. 
As to books, Charles E. Silberman's Criminal Violence, Crim-
inal Justice (NY: Random House, 1978) not only covers the field 
and recent research more thoroughly than others to date, but also 
contains a useful bibliography: James Q. Wilson's Thinking About 
Crime (NY: Basic Books, 1975), however, treats the basic issues 
with perhaps greater clarity and balanced breadth. While the quan-
tity of books, monographs, and reports produced annually remains 
well short of that in the national security field, it has lately been 
growing; more importantly, the quality is also improving. 
One of the main functions of LEAA is to develop and dissemi-
nate new knowledge and understanding in the criminal justice 
field. Toward that end it operates a National Criminal Justice 
Reference Service (NCJRS), which publishes bibliographical ma-
terial and otherwise assists research. Visitors will find NCJRS at 
1015 20th Street NW, Suite 400, in Washington; its mailing address 
is NCJRS, Box 6000, Rockville, Maryland 20850. 
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UNIT2 
ECONOMICPOLICY,ENERGY, 
AND THE ENVIRONMENT 
Herbert C. Morton 
The three topics of economic policy, energy, and the environ-
ment are much more closely related than might seem apparent at 
first glance, and perhaps the best way to appreciate their interde-
pendence it to put them in historical perspective. Since all are 
policy issues that have become important comparatively recently, 
the span of history is less than a half century. 
I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
Employment and Stabilization Policies 
The growing understanding that government has a continuing 
and major role to play in the operation of the American economy 
was officially and formally recognized after World War II when 
memories of the Depression of the 1930s were still fresh. The 
national government had imposed rationing, price controls, and 
other emergency regulations during wartime emergencies even 
before World War II, and during the 1930s it had intervened in the 
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economy to build public works and provide jobs on an unprece-
dented scale. But historically, it had acted more out of desperation 
than from any clear understanding of how the economy works. The 
uniqueness of the Employment Act of 1946 is that it reflected a 
national consensus and that it spelled out for the first time and 
established a federal commitment to the maintenance of a high 
level of economic activity on a continuing basis and not just in an 
emergency: 
The Congress declares that it is the continuing policy and 
responsibility of the Federal Government to use all prac-
ticable means consistent with its needs and obligations 
and other essential considerations of national policy, with 
the assistance and cooperation of industry, agriculture, 
labor, and state and local government to coordinate and 
utilize all its plans, functions and resources for the pur-
poses of creating and maintaining, in a manner calculated 
to foster and promote free competitive enterprise and the 
general welfare, conditions under which there will be 
afforded useful employment opportunities, including self 
employment, for those able, willing, and seeking to work, 
and to promote maximum employment, production, and 
purchasing power. (60 Stat. 33, Sec. 2, 1946) 
Less formally, the nation's major economic goals were widely 
described as jobs for all who wanted to work in a growing economy 
that would provide for a rising level of living. Later, as a result of 
postwar inflation and another burst of price increase during the 
Korean War, greater emphasis began to be given to the goal of price 
stability implied by the act's concern for purchasing power. 
. The Employment Act of 1946 reflected not only a determina-
tion to avoid future depressions but also the belief among some 
policy makers and their advisers that tools were finally available to 
make governmental intervention a constructive force. The accep-
tance of this governmental role was linked to a theoretical explana-
tion of how the economy functions, and to the growing availability 
0
~ statistical data that could provide the basis for policy decisions. 
Dis~greements persisted on specific policy objectives, on the ef-
fectiveness of alternative policy instruments and on the amount of 
reliance that could be placed on market forces, but there was 
nonetheless a broad consensus on the analytical framework. 
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The framework utilizes a broad set of tools that were 
fashioned largely out of the theories of John Maynard Keynes 
whose influential book of 1936, The General Theory of Employ~ 
ment, Interest, and Money, revolutionized the thinking of most 
economists, the teaching of economics, and the application of 
economic ideas to policy making. (For a readable introduction to 
Keynes's intellectual contributions, see The Worldly Philosophers 
by Robert L. Heilbroner; Herbert Stein assigns Keynes a smaller 
role in his study The Fiscal Revolution in America.) For purposes 
of this discussion, the essential point is that Keynes demonstrated 
that the economy may not be self-adjusting, as traditional eco-
nomic theory had long insisted, but that it could settle into an 
equilibrium at a level of activity far below its potential, with unused 
capacity and high rate of unemployment. This thesis provided a 
rationale for government intervention. 
At the same time that the General Theory was gaining atten-
tion, the United States was making substantial progress in setting 
up its system of national income accounts. These now provide 
periodic reports on the gross national product (GNP), (which is the 
total value of goods and services the economy produces), and or 
other measures such as national income, (which is the product left 
over after an allowance has been made for (a) the capital equipment 
that has been used up, and (b) for manufacturers· sales and excise 
taxes that are added to the price of the product before it is sold). 
For a description of the national income accounts, see a standard 
text such as Paul Samuelson's Economics, Chapter 10, .. The Na-
tional Income Accounts". The national income and product ac-
counts are reported quarterly in the government periodical Survey 
of Current Business, making it possible to keep score on the econ-
omy's performance. The analysis of changes in these accounts, 
using primarily Keynesian tools, is an essential ingredient of policy 
recommendations. 
Other governmental statistics were greatly improved during 
the 1930s and 1940s - the surveys of employment and unemploy-
ment and the price indexes issued by the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics. It is surprising to recall that unemployment figures durng the 
1930s were rough estimates based on very fragmentary evidence. 
Not until after World War II did the government establish the 
monthly current population survey covering some 50,000 house-
holds, which is the basis for the familiar and statistically sophisti-
cated monthly reports on employment and unemployment. (For 
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further information on these and other statistics on productivity, 
earnings, strike activities, and so on, see the biennial BLS Hand-
book of Labor Statistics and the BLS Handbook of Methods, 
which explain how these data are gathered and their reliability. 
Complementing the development of new economic tools and 
better statistics was a technological breakthrough - the develop-
ment of high-speed computers, which made possible the rapid 
manipulation of vast quantities of data. 
A new era of macroeconomics had dawned-the product of a 
new theoretical apparatus, an enlarged, more developed body of 
statistics to help guide policy making, and a growing consensus on 
the role of government in the economy symbolized by the Em-
ployment Act of 1946. And this took place only some three decades 
ago. 
Environmental Policy 
For at least fifteen years after the role of macroeconomic 
policy became accepted, questions of environmental policy were 
being considered only by a very few economists and policy mak-
ers, supported in some areas by conservationists, who had long 
been concerned with soil erosion, degradations of forests, and 
despoiling of scenic treasures. Most policy makers did not view the 
environment as a distinct area for public concern. In 1960, for 
example, the report on Goals for Americans prepared by a group of 
distinguished citizens for President Eisenhower, took no notice of 
the environmental problem. Rachel Carson's Silent Spring (1966) 
alerted the reading public to the dangers of indiscriminate use of 
chemicals, but strong opposition blunted any moves toward a 
major policy change. In 1968, the Brookings Institution published 
Agenda for the Nation, a far-reaching discussion of issues that 
would confront the next president. Each chapter was devoted to a 
major problem facing the incoming administration. But of the 18 
chapters, not one was devoted to environmental policy, though by 
1968 env.ironmental concerns were being widely discussed and the 
beginnings of a federal policy were in the making. Within two 
years, the National Environmental Protection Act, enacted 1970 
marked the beginning of a broad federal approach to environmentai 
policy (though there had been piecemeal bits of legislation related 
to environmental concerns, particularly air and water pollution). It 
was followed by the Air Quality Amendments of 1970, the Water 
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Poll~tion Control Amendments of 1972, and other legislation, in-
cludmg more recently, the Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976. 
Collectively, these stamp the 1970s as the environmental policy 
decade. 
Energy Policy 
As a major focus of national concern, energy policy is even of 
more recent vintage, though the specter of depletion of natural 
resources, including fossil fuels, has been lurking around since the 
early nineteenth century with the Malthusian warning of the ten-
dency of population to grow at a geometric rate, and thus to outrun 
the world's supply of resources. World War II and the Korean War, 
which were enormous drains on the world's stock of fossil fuel and 
minerals, triggered another round of concern with a natural re-
sources policy. It led to the appointment of the President's Com-
mission on Materials Policy (the so-called Paley Commission) and 
its impressive assessment, Re sources for Freedom. Subsequently, 
in 1952 with support from the Ford Foundation, a research center, 
Resources for the Future, was established in Washington to study 
resource policy, including energy policy on a continuing basis. The 
notion that there was a major energy issue for policy makers to 
consider dido 't strike home to the public, however, until the em-
bargo imposed in the fall of 1973 by the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC). The long lines at gas stations, the 
quadrupling of the price of crude petroleum, and growing concern 
about the economic costs and the physical hazards of nuclear 
power-all suddenly made energy front-page news. Although the 
crisis of 1973-74 appeared short-lived to the public, the underlying 
problems of supply and price were not, and a dual problem arose. 
Policy makers had to determine not only what policies the United 
State should adopt over the next few years to assure an adequate 
and secure source of energy at reasonable prices, but they dis-
covered that they also had to determine how to persuade the public 
that energy is indeed a serious problems-a difficult task at a time 
when gasoline and other fuels appear to be plentiful. Although the 
era of cheap energy, which had been an essential ingredient of the 
country's enormous economic growth in the preceding half century 
or more, is over, nearly fifty percent of the public (according to a 
1977 Gallup Poll) are not aware that the United States has to import 
oil to meet energy needs. 
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The New Challenge to Economic Policy roblem are serious 
Both the pollution problem and the ener8Yt~ful exploitation of 
in their own right. .Dirty air, dirty water, wa1azards to h_ealth and 
resources, erosion, toxic substances-all are gY costs pmch con .. 
affronts to aesthetic sensibilities. Higher ener r costs on the auto 
~umer budgets. Moreover, t~ey impose hig:00g others, forcing 
mdustry and the petrochemical industrY, a rnore. broadly, en .. 
changes in products and processes. aut, re indispensable as .. 
vironmental concerns and energy shortages a y 13il1ions of dollars 
pects of the overall performance of the econoJ'Jl ~d the expenditure 
have already been spent for pollution control,1 aeadY on the books. 
of tens of billions more is mandated by la~ a ~andards is seen by 
The cost of achieving air and water qualttY 5 jobs and to contin .. 
some labor groups and businesses as a threat tot1awing out of the 
ued operation of plants. Billions of dollaf~ncreased costs of oi} 
country to the OPEC nations to pay for the 1• ·ng funds out of the 
have been likened to the effects of a tax in dra;°~rn products could 
economy. Higher costs of energy and petro e 00001y. 
have widespread, disruptive effects on the ec croeconomic goal 
Thus, by the mid 1970s the pursuit ofth~ rna recise target after 
of full employment-which seemed like a f8;irl~:d problem. Within 
World War II-became a much more compitca jobs and for eco .. 
thirty years it became clear that the search for ther goals-jobs 
. b n foro nom1c growth must e tempered by concer d"ng the environ .. 
without creating inflation, jobs without degr~. 's of oil and other 
ment, and jobs without exhausting limited suPP ,e f the economic 
resources. Above all, it appeared that the nature O Is change and 
problem is in constant flux: circumstances and goaust be fle;ible. 
consequently policies to cope with these changes Ill: sues in more 
The purpose of this chapter is to explore. these ~ the k · nds of 
detail, to suggest the range of policy choices an t· 1 f how 
. ·nustra ions 0 trade-offs that must be faced, to give some 1 . d" t th 
. . and to m 1ca e e 
economists thmk about some of these matters, 
possibilities and limitations of.policy making. 
II. Issues in Macroeconomic Policy 
The Tools 
Government influences economic activity by the so-called 
automatic built-in stabilizers, by discretionary policies, and by 
economic controls. 
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The automatic stabilizers are, first, the federal corporate and 
personal income taxe~. Duri?g periods of rising business activity, 
these taxes take an mcreasmg proportion of money out of the 
economy, thus reducing the pace of expansion; during business 
slowdowns, they take out a smaller proportion, thus helping to 
cushion the economy from the full effects of the slowdown. Other 
automatic stabilizers include federal payments for unemployment 
insurance, which increase during a recession and decline in periods 
of high economic activity, and Social Security payments, which 
remain rather stable despite an increase or fall-off in economic 
activity. Such payments help sustain purchasing power and eco-
nomic activity, and, like the changes in tax revenue, they go into 
effect automatically without the need for any congressional or 
executive action. Wilfred Lewis's study, Federal Fiscal Policy in 
the Postwar Recessions, showed that the automatic stabilizers 
helped substantially to offset the loss of income caused by the four 
economic downturns in the period between World War II and the 
Vietnam War. 
Discretionary policies are of two types. One isfiscal policy-
the use of the government's taxing and spending powers to main-
tain high employment and stable purchasing power. Generally, if 
the federal government increases its spending or reduces taxes, or 
both, it will stimulate economic activity. Ifit raises taxes or reduces 
its spending, it will curb economic activity. (For a fuller discussion 
of these generalizations see Samuelson or any other standard text.) 
But note one essential assumption which is implicit in the foregoing 
statements, and which is a significant qualification-that all other 
things remain equal (the economists' familiar qualification ex-
pressed in the Latin phrase, ceteris paribus). 
A second instrument of discretionary policy is monetary po/-
icy, which refers to the leverage that the Federal Reserve Board 
can exert on the economy by changing the re discount rate (the rate 
it charges Federal Reserve banks when they want to borrow from 
the central bank) by open market operations and by varying the 
amount of reserves that a bank must retain. (See Samuelson, and 
G. L. Bach, Making Monetary and Fiscal Policy.) 
A third type of federal policy is the use of direct and indirect 
controls. Direct controls include rationing and price controls that 
are common in wartime, controls over installment borrowing that 
have been enacted at various times, and the 1971 freeze of wages 
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and prices (so-called Phase I) imposed by the Nixon administra-
tion. Indirect controls (which really are not controls in the formal 
sense) include (1) the so-called moral suasion that the Federal 
Reserve has used to encourage bankers to behave in ways it 
considered desirable and (2) wage and price guidelines. In 1962, for 
example, the Kennedy Administration announced the so-called 
guideposts policy. It suggested that wage increases should gener-
ally be held to 3.2 percent, approximately the rate at which pro-
ductivity had been growing in the economy, on the premise that 
increases of that amount would not add to inflationary pressures. 
Proponents of the guideposts approach credited it with an impor-
tant role in the maintenance of price stability during the 1962-65 
period, but this view is not universally shared. 1 
Effectiveness of Macro Policies 
The relative effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy during 
the first twenty-five years after World War II and the limitations of 
these policy tools are analyzed in Bach's book. In general, the 
lessons of the experience described in the book are still applicable· 
But it should be added that subsequent experience with ma-
croeconomic policy has made economists less optimistic about the 
capacity of fiscal and monetary policy to keep the economy on a 
growth path while keeping prices under control. The pressure to 
meet the nation's defense needs in the late 1960s, while maintaining 
the expansion of peaceful economic activities, led to a competition 
for economic resources which caused higher prices. 
In 1971 the government froze prices and devalued the dollar in 
an effort to slow down inflation, reduce unemployment, and re-
duce the balance-of-payments deficit. The next year was a good 
one: both unemployment and the inflation rate declined. Then the 
~ecession of 1974-75 ensued. It was exacerbated by the four-fold 
mcrease in oil prices, which also fed inflationary pressures, and for 
the first time the nation faced the two problems at the same time-
rampant inflation and rising unemployment. 
Such a combination confounded the traditional assumptions 
about macro economic policy. For years policy makers had as-
sumed that they had a tradeoff to contend with. They could (1) 
iThe lfOvernment also has enacted a wide range of other economic rel[ulations 
covermg f.ayment of minimum wages, airline rates, rules go,•erning the trading in 
c'!mmod1~1es, ~nd so o~,, but these regulations lie omside the scope of this study 
smce their maJor goal ,s not related to the level of economic activity. 
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st!mulate the. eco~omy and reduce unemployment by tolerating 
slightly more mflation, or (2) keep prices stable and live with a little 
more unemployment. For about two decades a rate of unemploy-
ment of 4 percent was assumed to be consistent with a reasonably 
stable price level- that is, a price level that wouldn't rise more 
than 1 or 2 percent a year. If prices were rising at a faster rate, the 
level of economic activity could be cut by macroeconomic policy 
at the cost of a higher rate of unemployment. But a situation in 
which high unemployment and high rates of price increases 
coexisting created a different problem and kindled new debates 
among economists as well as among policy makers about what 
might be done. 
The behavior of the economy in the mid-1970s was a humbling 
experience for believers in the efficacy of governmental interven-
tion. Some of the best-known exponents of discretionary fiscal 
policy conceded that perhaps they had been overly optimistic 
about the possibilities of fiscal policy during the 1960s. They also 
acknowledged that a new problem was posed by the existence of 
inflation and unemployment at the same time. 
What caused the persistence of inflation and high unemploy-
ment at the same time? Several contributing factors have been 
identified. One is the changing composition of the labor force. The 
bulge in the teen-age population - which resulted from the baby 
boom of the 1950s-greatly increased the proportion of persons in 
the labor force in age groups that traditionally have had high 
unemployment rates because they are untrained and are exper-
imenting with different types of jobs. At the same time, the propor-
tion of women who have entered the labor force {which increased 
from about 33 percent of working-age women in 1946 to about 46 
percent in the mid-I970s) had a similar result. 
Another contributing factor was the increasing rigidity of the 
economic system in resisting downward adjustments of both prices 
and wages. When economic activity slackened off, large corpo-
rations were able to hold the line on prices. Strong unions were 
often able, even in slack times, to obtain wage increases in excess 
of productivity gains. 
Another factor was the impact of the OPEC oil embargo. The 
ensuing increase in oil prices not only increased the cost of trans-
portation and heating, but also of petrochemicals and many other 
products that require petroleum in their production. 
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The experience of the mid-I970s caused a reassessment of the 
tentials of macroeconomic policy and more modesty in the 
~~aims of economists about how soon the United States economy 
·ght achieve a more tolerable level of unemployment (say, 5 
m:rcent instead of the 4 percent target that had prevailed). Most 
:conomists came to believe that the country will not achieve even a 
5 percent unemploy~ent rate ~efore the mid-I980s. Still, the eco-
nomic activists remained convinced that so long as the economy 
was operating at less than full capacity, and with unemployment 
running at 6 or 7 percent, there were grounds for pursuing dis-
cretionary policies to stimulate the economy. In short, there was 
less than full agreement and more uncertainty, even among the 
experts, as to what policies might be most effective in moving 
toward the more complex goals. 
Employment 'Jraining Policies 
During the 1950s and 1960s there was a running debate among 
economists over the best approach to reducing unemployment. 
One group stressed what it called the need to combat "'structural 
unemployment" - unemployment (a) that was especially high in 
distressed areas, such as Appalachia, and in the central cities, as a 
result of changes in technology and the movement of industry; and 
(b) that arose because of the higher proportion of youths and 
untrained minority workers in the labor force. The other group 
argued that although there may be structural unemployment, it was 
not the major problem. The major problem was the weakness of 
aggregate demand. If the economy were growing rapidly enough, 
they argued, workers would move away from depressed areas of 
high employment, and youth and minority workers would be 
drawn into jobs. 
Over a period of time, the polarization of views faded, and 
though economists still differ in the importance they attach to 
monetary and fiscal policy on the one hand, and structural policies, 
on the other, both approaches seem firmly established in govern-
ment policy. The manpower programs established by the Labor 
Department in the early 1960s sought to provide for both work 
experience and training for youths and disadvantaged. These con-
tinue today under the (less sexist) title of employment training 
programs. At the same time, efforts have been made to advance 
opportunities for youth, women, and minority workers through 
programs to help distressed areas and to reduce discrimination in 
hiring and promotion. 
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111. Issues in Environmental Policy 
National concern with environmental issues has proceeded on 
two levels. One has been the citizen level, exemplified by the 
conservation movement of the early Twentieth Century and the 
environmental movement of the 1960s and 1970s. The other has 
been the research and policymaking level, exemplified by efforts to 
assess benefits and costs of alternative strategies for improving the 
quality of the environment. The two levels are closely related, but 
since specific threats to the environment and citizen action are well 
covered in the press and are daily brought to public attention, the 
emphasis below is on some of the conceptual issues that underline 
efforts to cope with the special problems posed by the environ-
ment. 
When Markets Fail 
When markets do not work, the distinctive aspect of en-
vironmental policy can be illuminated by contrasting en-
vironmental goods-clean air, clean water, wilderness, and so on 
- with goods that are ordinarily exchanged in the market place. 
Taking an economist's point of view, the competitive market 
provides the ideal way for determining what shall be produced, 
how goods and services will be produced, and how they will be 
distributed. It provides for the expression of individual preferences 
in jobs and in the choice of goods and services to buy. It gives 
producers incentives and flexibility in meeting the demand. Some 
markets work better than others, and, unfortunately, few work as 
well as the economists' models postulate. But, by and large, they 
work well enough in the United States to permit a predominantly 
free economy. Where they work badly, government has stepped in 
with regulations or with the direct provision of services. 
Among crucial omissions from market transactions are the 
so-called common property resources, such as the air, rivers, 
oceans, and scenic wilderness areas. Most of these resources 
belong to all collectively; they are not readily divisible, and so they 
are shared. They do not enter into market transactions. 
For a long time, they were commonly regarded as free goods. 
As long as there was enough for everyone-even though water and 
air were essential for life- their abundance meant they generally 
went unpriced. Further, so long as the population was too small to 
make heavy demands on the supply of air and water, natural 
processes easily took care of pollution arising from human habita-
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Regulations vs. Incentives: the Legislative R ecord 
By and large , two types of intervention have been considered 
by policy makers. One is the enactment of standards: either an 
effluent standard, or a limitation on how much of a particular 
pollutant can be discharged into water or the air, or an ambient 
standard , requiring that in a given area the water or air must be 
maintained at a certain quality. The other :wproach is the use of 
incentives to encourage polluters to alter their production pro-
cesses or treat their effluents to minimize the destructive effects 
and to include these costs in the price of the product. The first 
governmental intervention relied entirely on the regulatory ap-
proach of standards, supplemented by subsidies for waste treat-
ment ; but in recent years shortcomings of the direct regulatory 
approach have led to an increasing interest in developing incen-
tives that would require less policing and that might utilize market 
forces to help bring about compliance. 
Some of the major legislative efforts to protect the environ-
ment are described below. 
1. Several acts have been passed during the past thirty years 
to improve water quality, beginning with the Water Pollu-
tion Control Act of 1948 which gave the federal government 
authority to conduct research on the problem. The Act was 
amended in 1956 to provide federal grants for municipal 
water treatment plants. Further amendments in 1972 in-
creased funds for municipal waste treatment plants and 
provided for federal effluent limits for different sources of 
pollution, including issuance of discharge permits for in-
dustrial and municipal plants that meet the standards. The 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) began issuing 
guidelines defining the pollution allowable for each indus-
try after July 1977 (under the criterion of" the best practica-
ble control technology") and a higher standard, "best avail-
able technology," to be achieved by 1983. Two-thirds of 
industrial dischargers and half of the municipalities met the 
1977 standards and were issued permits. For the others, 
EPA tried to work out a flexible approach where there was 
evidence of a good-faith effort to meet the deadline. Provi-
sion also was made for exceptions, such as exemption of 
Ohio's Mahoning Valley steel plants from national stan-
dards because of EPA's fear that enforcement of the abate-
57 
ment standards would ca " 
ployment disrupt· ,, . use severe economic and em-
. ion m the valle 
Studies of water ual. y. 
this regulatory a q ity over the past few years under 
· pproach sug t h . improved but t ges t at water quality has 
' no as much c Noticeable progress has or as iast_ as had been hoped. 
source" discha ~een made m controlling ·'point 
little has beenr~es (pollutmg by an identifiable plant), but 
h 
one to reduc .. . . 
c arges, or runoff fro . e non-point source" dis-
2. The 1955 Air Poll t· m agncultural and urban land 
u ion Cont J A · 
ernment on the path of r ro ~t star~ed the federal gov-
problems. The CI A" esearch mto air pollution control 
ean Ir Act f 19 ment powers Po O 63 added some enforce-r h . wer to set . . IS ed two years I t . emission standards was estab-A a er m the A· Q . 
mendments of 1970 f ir uahty Act. The Clean Air 
over air pollution ~r~her strengthened federal controls 
st d , prov1dmg fo . an ards and stat . r national ambient air quality 
w·th e implem t · 1 the standards 11 en ation plans for compliance 
optimistic and we · argets set for mid-1975 proved overlY 
o . . re not met St 
ngmally scheduled c · andards for auto emissions 
1980 ior the 1978 
3 
· models were put off to 
. Congress recognized th f; 
;as not solely a local e ac~ that disposal of solid wastes 
..:a_sourc~s Recovery A:~ ~?ional pr~blem and passed the 
r st_e Disposal Act of 196 
1970
, which modified the Solid 
~o~vides for planning grant;- lhe act, amended in 1976, 
4 I rce recovery and . ' emonstration grants for re-
. n 1976 Congr ' improved disposal f; ·1· . 
Act whi ess enacted the . ac1 1t1es. 
Sl
·g '.fi ch some observe Toxic Substances Control 
n1 icant rs regard . It . act to date Its as potentially the most 
requires th · purpos · · fore the at new chemicals be is primarily preventive. 
Y are put on th e screened and tested be-
on the ma k e market a ct h hazardo r et be tested if th n t at chemicals already 
5. Other leu~ ~o ~uman health or;~ are ~uspected of being 
Zone M g1s at1on during this .e environment. 
Act of 
1
~;:gement Act of 1972penoct included the Coastal 
· and the Safe Drinking Water 
All of the 1970 . 
broad enviro s Ieg1slation is . 
Environment:~ent~J policy goals 
1
; effect a_n outgrowth of 
provides for Policy Act (NEPA)et_forth ~n the National 
a Council on E . signed m 1970, which 
nv1ronmental Quality to 
58 
monitor environmental change and to advise the president 
on environmental problems . NEPA also provides for the 
preparation of environmental impact statements by all fed-
eral agencies whenever any of their actions may have signif-
icant impact on the environment. 
Although it is perhaps too early to assess the impact of 
this panopoly of legislation, some persistent critics have 
been skeptical from the outset that much can be achieved 
by this regulatory approach. They point to the failure of 
other regulatory programs (in transportation particularly) 
drawing attention to the possibilities of delaying enforce-
ment through court action, difficulties of setting standards 
and monitoring performance. They think the approach is 
ineffective and costly. Defenders of the legislation of the 
1970s concede imperfections, but insist that the regulatory 
approach taken was the only feasible way to start an en-
vironmental protection program. Some support the efforts 
of the critics of regulation to introduce a system of charges 
and other incentives to supplement the regulations . 
Rationale for Charges 
The so-called "charges" approach stems from economic 
analysis. Schultze and Kneese point out in Pollution, Prices, and 
Public Policy a number of economic lessons that suggest the use-
fulness of economic incentives. These include: 
I. The cost of removing additional units of pollutan~ from 
water or air keeps increasing. That is , if it costs a dime to 
remove the first pound of waste from water, it may cost a 
dollar to remove an additional pound after 80 or 90 percent 
of the pollution has been removed . "Depending upon the 
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percent removal may cost as much as the entire effort 0 
going from zero to 97 percent. " 2 
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substitutes or made it possible to utilize ores or materials of lower 
quality. 
A highly influential study in the early 1960s -Scarcity and 
Growth by Harold Barnett and Chandler Morse - pointed to the 
fact that despite greatly increased use of natural resources, price 
patterns over nearly a century indicated that prices for resource 
commodities were generally declining. If a shortage was develop-
ing, or was even visible on the distant horizon, they argued, prices 
would have been climbing. Historical experience and faith in con-
tinued technological advance combined to nurture an optimistic 
view of the adequacy of resources. 
The Changing Energy Picture 
Nevertheless, during the past two decades , a number of 
?bservers were becoming increasingly conc~rned about the rate of 
mcrease in the use of the world's energy resources . Energ~ use-
particularly in the form of petroleum-was not only growing _and 
propelling record rates of industrial expansion in advanc~d nati~ns 
such as Japan and Germany but it was also growing at an m~reasi~g 
rate in the developing countries. The use of energy ~npl~d m 
Western Europe and rose by nearly 500 percent in Japan Just m the 
twenty years after 1950. At the same time, oil and gas supplanted 
coal as the dominant major energy source around the world. 
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sharply. Nevertheless, after the embargo was lifted and memories 
of the gas shortage faded, public concern with an energy problem 
also faded rapidly. Although the determinants of the long-run en-
ergy problem remained what they were before the embargo, United 
States consumption and import of oil, after briefly leveling off, 
started moving upward again. By 1979 and 1980, however, the 
sharp increases in the retail price of gasoline began to exert signifi-
cant restraint on consumption. Americans bought smaller cars and 
drove less. Adjustment to the new energy reality was in progress. 
How dependent the United States is on foreign sources of 
essential resources has not been widely appreciated by the general 
public. Facts were slow to make inroads on the myth of American 
abundance until the oil embargo. There were occasional charges of 
American profligacy- a nation with six percent of the world's 
population was using thirty percent of the world's resources. This 
statement, or a variation on it, appeared periodically in public 
discussions. But the full implication of American dependence on 
the rest of the world was not appreciated. The United States is 
dependent on foreign sources for 90 to 100 percent of its supply of 
chromium, titanium, manganese, cobalt, mica, columbium, and 
strontium. It supplies more than half of its needs for only relatively 
few materials, including, fortunately, iron, petroleum, lead, cop-
per, and salt. But even here, the supplementary foreign sources of 
supply are not firmly secure. 
In the best of all possible worlds, policy makers could look to 
foreign trade to supply the United States with materials in ex-
change for food and manufactured goods. But in the real world, 
excessive dependence on foreign supplies can be risky - espe-
cially dependence on foreign sources for a commodity as essential 
as petroleum. One of the nation's first reactions to the OPEC 
embargo was to proclaim Project Independence that would make 
the nation secure against disruption of its energy supply by 1985. 
The slogan of "independence" faded as soon as the impracticality 
of the approach began to be appreciated. The possibilities of other 
~ltematives began to be recognized, such as the possibility of 
mcreasingly interdependent relations with OPEC. 
One response to our altered circumstances has been a rising 
interest in more efficient use of resources. The word •• conserva-
tion" has returned to prominence in public discussions - with a 
somewhat different meaning than it had during the conservation 
movement of the early twentieth century. Then it was aimed largely 
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at the saving of trees and scenic lands, and later at soil conservation 
when, during the 1930s, dust storms posed a threat to western 
farmlands. The focus of conservation today is on energy. 
Conservation is one tool for reducing the vast drain on re-
sources. It can be important both in the short run and the long run, 
but its potential is limited. No precise estimates are available on the 
savings from such measures as encouraging installation of better 
insulation in homes and other buildings, adjusting thermostats so 
that buildings do not use as much heat in winter and air condition-
ing in summer, improving efficiency of home appliances, reducing 
automobile speeds, switching to smaller cars, and promoting 
greater use of mass transit. 
'Iransportation is a sector that has drawn particular attention. 
It accounts for more than half of American consumption of petro-
leum and a fourth of total energy consumption. By contrast, most 
other advanced nations_ which are smaller geographically and 
have better developed public transportation systems - devote 
only about an eighth of total energy to transportation. Part of this 
difference is attributable to high gasoline taxes (which have made 
gasoline two to three times more expensive abroad than in the 
United States). The production of smaller cars with greater fuel 
economy has thus been encouraged abroad. 
But one can hardly look at the energy conservation potential 
of the transport sector without taking a broader view of transporta-
tion as a major component of the nation's economic activity. The 
manufacturing of transport equipment, the trucking and rail indus-
tries, etc., provide nearly four million jobs. In the public sector, 
spending for highways ranks second to education, and taxes on 
motor fuel and vehicles are important sources of revenue. Public 
policies to promote transportation date back to early years in 
American history, with expenditures for canals, and have contin-
ued with grants of land for railroads, subsidies for airlines, and 
establishment of the Highway lhist Fund with its enormous impact 
on road development across the country. The federal government's 
first regulatory commission was the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, which still plays a major (and highly controversial) role in 
economic affairs, along with the Civil Aeronautics Board. In the 
field of public finance, questions about how to manage transport 
expenditures have generated considerable debate. (For a discus-
sion of user charges vs. general revenues and related issues, see 
Groves and Bish, Financing Government, pp. 239-53.) 
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The transport sector also provides one of the major challenges 
to environmental management. The automobile, as a source of 
carbon monoxide and other pollutants, has been a major target of 
environmental regulation. (See Garvey, Energy, Ecology, Econ-
omy, Chapter 6, especially pp. 116-20.) , 
In short, transportation exemplifies the interrelationships of 
the three central themes of this chapter. The Federal Energy Ad-
ministration study, The National Energy Outlook, estimates that 
higher prices and conservation measures could reduce the rate of 
growth in energy consumption from 3.6 percent a year (the average 
rate for 1977) to 2.2 percent. Given the growth rate of the nation, 
such savings serve primarily to buy time in which to develop new 
sources of supply, to make headway in the slowing down of popula-
tion growth, to begin thinking about changing some growth incen-
tives in governmental policy, and perhaps even to change life styles 
away from the emphasis on consumption of material goods. 
While conservation is widely endorsed as a policy that can 
make a useful contribution over the next few years, there is less 
t?an universal agreement on specific policies to achieve a reduc-
tion in consumption and the precise objectives of conservation 
Policies. Conservation could be promoted, for example, by decon-
trolling (and hence, presumably, raising) gas and oil prices, so that 
consumers would have a financial incentive to use less gas and oil. 
But such a policy could well have side effects that are highly 
ob~ectionable - the inflationary impact of diffusion of higher oil 
Pnces through the economy, the depressing impact on business 
activity, windfall profits to some energy producers and distrib-
utors, and inequality of the burdens. Discussion of these matters 
Will be of public concern for some time. 
Alternative Energy Sources 
For the long run, the focus is on research that will lead to a 
source of energy that might be as cheap and plentiful as oil once 
Was-with a minimal threat to the environment. One such source is 
solar energy, which is abundant enough, but which has not yet been 
harnessed in a way that makes it commercially feasible on a large 
scale. In selected instances it is being used in home heating and 
cooling, and this may prove to be its most promising use in the near 
future. Considerable research is under way to determine more 
effective ways to generate electricity from the sun. The prospect of 
continuing increases in oil prices reduces the time before solar 
energy becomes competitive with oil. 
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Another potential energy source for the distant future is fu-
sion, a process that obtains energy from water. This source also 
looks desirable on resource and environmental grounds, but its 
feasibility is still not proved. Even if scientists succeed in demon-
strating a practical method of fusion power in the next few years, it 
will be well into the twenty-first century before fusion power plants 
can be put into operation. The essential difference between solar 
power and fusion is that the feasibility of solar power has been 
demonstrated. It has been used for heating and in solar batteries. 
Its practicality for some uses is within reach. Fusion is unproved. 
For the near term - between our present situation and the 
long-run hope for power from the sun and water-we will continue 
to be highly dependent on oil, with coal and possibly nuclear power 
playing a greater role. Coal is plentiful, but poses hazards. Strip 
mining degrades the land, underground mining is a hazardous 
occupation, and the burning of coal contributes to air pollution. 
This is an especially serious matter in the Southwest and in the 
states of Montana and Wyoming where exceptionally rich coal 
veins lie. The local communities also are concerned about boom-
town development if the nation seeks to augment its coal supply 
from these sources. (Gerald Garvey's book, Energy, Ecology, 
Economy analyzes the energy-ecology tradeoff). 
Nuclear technology has been proved, and about 100 nuclear 
plants are in operation. Collectively they produce over 8 percent of 
the nation's electricity and could produce 26 percent by 1985. But 
the costs of construction have mounted greatly, so that the appar-
ent economic advantages have largely been eroded, and reliability 
of the plants has been less than expected. At the same time, 
development of nuclear power has been hampered by public con-
cerns over thermal pollution and radiation leaks, possibility of a 
nuclear disaster, (dramatically emphasized by the Three-mile Is-
land accident) need for safe and lasting procedures for handling and 
disposing of radioactive wastes, and fears of nuclear theft and 
proliferation of nuclear weapons to irresponsible governments, 
particularly if the breeder reactor is developed. Several efforts by 
state referenda to pass laws that would place severe restrictions on 
nuclear construction were defeated in 1976. Nevertheless, there 
was sufficient public opposition to discourage power companies 
and induce them to cut back on their plans to construct nuclear 
plants. Thus, there is much doubt of the former FEA's projection 
that nuclear power will supply 26 percent of electricity needs by 
1985. 
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face the nati um er of uncertainties and alternative c ~ .
0 the develo on. So far there has been little effective leadersh•P 1 
Pment of a d . So n a equate policy 
me mode t t · p JicY 
and Conserv 1. s s eps were included in the 1975 Energy O f a ion Act wh. h . . out o federal price c ic provides for a gradual phasing 
. ontrols fu I d cre-
ation of a strate . ' e economy standards for autos , an 
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-:-nearly four Years af eum r:serve. Nevertheless, as o mt bil-
1ty to an interru t· ter the oil embargo-the nation's vulnera73 
I P ion of I · J9 · 
mportation of 0 -1 supp Y was greater than it was JO h 0 40 percent of th1 wa~ greater than ever (accounting for more t a23 
e nation's t 1 'th percent in 1970 ) S ota consumption compared WI t 
d · tockpT · ' . ge 
un erway. Th I mg in 1977 was J·ust beginning to . 
ere was on 1 · tries 
Wer~ ~aving their diffi e s. ight consolation: the OPEC cou~ hlY 
amb1t1ous develop iculties as well. The costs of their big r 
tha th ment and ·1· h·ghe 
n ey had ant· · mi itary programs proved to be 1 . p · 1c1pated Wh' 1se 
~tees, the cost of · ile they still had incentives to ra high t h an embarg · a)sO 0 
t em. Moreov f' 0 m terms of lost revenues was Jd 
enable the OPEC nat:r, ears that earnings from petroleum wo~-' 
markets f ions to ex t fi nc1i:u 
. . 
0 the deveJo ed . er undue press ure in the ma 
I Amid talk of Pol· P nations receded eum s · icy alte · · tro-
uppJies, Petroleu ~natives and speculation about pe _ 
m Pnces d go" 
lN ' an petroleum politics, the 
. Uclear Power· I 
S<·1e111ist . . ssues a nct Ch . d 
J , sponsored b 01ces, ti, , 197 . . ·5J,e Proceed ll'ith deve/ Y the Ford Fou, l . 7 report of a pa nel of dts flllCtil 
1 
( fl 
lrght 11·ater reacto 
0 f1Jnent of the breedtdar,o,i, cond11ded that there is 110 neetf/lf 
r ts 011 , ,r er reac t d · thfl( 
' 
0
, the ene or 11nng this century. but 
rgy Options that ll'arrants consideratioll· 
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ernment moved toward improving the administration of energy 
policies through reorganization of scattered energy activities into a 
single Department of Energy, which was established October I, 
1977. 
Recommendations for energy policy run into goals of other 
public policies . For example , enthusiasm for switching from oil, an 
increasingly scarce resource, to coal, a very abundant one, is 
dampened by concerns about the environmental costs of a major 
increase in coal production and consumption. And pr~posals t? 
enact taxes on gas-guzzling cars have raised concerns m Detroit 
about loss of jobs . Proposals to increase gasoline taxes and there~y 
dampe n consumption are cha llenged by concerns for t~ose m 
middle and lower income groups who are dependent on the1r auto-
mobiles . 
And so we return to the world of tradeoffs-hoping that policy" 
choices will be governed , at leas t in part, by a rational establish-
ment of goals and a rational consideration of the benefits and costs 
of alternative courses of action. 
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Comment 
ary Assignments 
The standard . 
note that it . assignment J; S ·e 
ame d ts subject to ch or equence 2 .2 fo/loll'S. Plea~ 
n or re · ange by ti diJY throu h. vise it . In that 1e preceptor, who may ,no I ' 
g the cl event you ·11 nt Uster direct ll't receive a new assign me 
1 p or. 
. repare a one 
ings I . -page evaluat' d-
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s ignificant points and explain what, if any, contribution the 
book makes to your thinking a bout policy problems. Assess 
major strengths or weaknesses of the author ' s argument. 
(You may substitute a comment on one of the additional 
readings of your choice for any of the required readings, but 
you will be responsible for the content of all the required 
readings.) 
2 . Prepare a policy paper- not to exceed ten double-spaced 
typewritten pages - on either Topic A or Topic B. 
Topic A. Assume you are on the staff of a top gov-
ernmental official. Prepare a paper on one of the following 
issues which most affects your interests or field of work: 
environmental policy, energy policy, employment policy, 
stabilization policy (or some part of the issue , such as water 
pollution , or energy conservation). Identify the problem 
and explain its origin . State what you assume to be the 
objectives of the agency which has primary responsibility 
for it. Identify a lternative approaches for dealing with the 
problem. Assess the probable consequences of the alterna-
tives, a nd make a recommendation. 
Topic B. (This topic to be chosen only by participants 
whose agency is a heavy user of energy. Identify the 
agency.) Assume that you have received a me morandum 
from your supervisor as follows: 
"Continuing concern about energy supplies and costs 
indicate s that I will need an appraisal of the problems 
that we will encounter in meeting the e nergy needs of 
our agency. Please prepare for me a statement of the 
probable impacts, direct and indirect, of future energy 
stringencies on our program. This statement should 
review what we already have done. I want your report 
so that it may be considered in the prepara tion of our 
next budget, but your study should not be limited to 
short-range effects. It should be an aid t~ lon~er-~ange 
planning. I will want to know what our s1 tuatwn ts apt 
to be te n years he nce. Limit your report to less than 
2,500 words, o r as much less as you can and still cover 
the subjects. Will any of our present programs need 
redirection? Let me have your reasons a nd backup 
mate rial. as well as your conclusions and recom-
mendations. " 
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